Illiberty of Contract by Smythe, Donald J.
California Western School of Law 
CWSL Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Illiberty of Contract 
Donald J. Smythe 
California Western School of Law, dsmythe@cwsl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
35 Quinnipiac Law Review 461 (2017) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
THE ILLIBERTY OF CONTRACT
DonaldJ. Smythe*
[I]t has become customary to discuss many aspects of our problem
under the heading of 'freedom of contract.". . . But the phrase also
gives rise to misconceptions. In the first place ... the question is not
what contracts individuals will be allowed to make but rather what
contracts the state will enforce.
- Friedrich A. Hayek
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1. INTRODUCTION
The term "liberty of contract" is usually associated with the
* Donald J. Smythe, B.A., M.A., Carleton University; M.Phil., PhD., Yale University;
J.D., University of Virginia. Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
IFRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 230 (1 st ed. 1960).
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doctrine that the due process clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits or should prohibit the State2 from regulating contracts between
private individuals.3 It is also often used synonymously with the term
"freedom of contract." 4 Many libertarians and free-market advocates
embrace the liberty of contract doctrine because they are averse to State
interferences with private market transactions.5 But the term is ironic
because a contract is only legally binding if courts will enforce it. Since
courts constitute the third branch of government, they are State actors; 6
and contractual enforcement involves the exercise of the State's powers
of coercion.' This is problematic because the State's exercise of coercion
2 When a capital "S" is used in the word "State," it is meant to indicate a reference to
government generally, not a state government within the United States.
3 The United States Supreme Court evinced a presumption against allowing government
regulations of private activities during the Lochner era in the early twentieth century. But
libertarian thought and laissez-faire doctrine did not influence the Court's jurisprudence at that
time. See, e.g., DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 1-10 (2011) (discussing court jurisprudence during the Lochner
era.). Mayer argues that the distinction between substantive due process and procedural due
process is an artifact of those who were critical of the Court's liberty of contract
jurisprudence. Id. at 11-42.
4 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, GEO. MASON U. L & ECON. RES.
SERIES, no. 08-51 (Aug. 19, 2008).
5 According to Professor Bernstein, "American courts began to assert that a right to
contract free from unreasonable government regulations is protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment" by the late nineteenth century. Id. Although the protections of
the liberty of contract doctrine have waned since then, so much that "freedom of contract
is ... [now] ... almost entirely unprotected under modern constitutional law," the doctrine
still stands for the normative principle that there should be a right to contract free from
government regulation. Id.
6 The United States Supreme Court has generally limited the definition of State action
under the "State action doctrine" to acts undertaken by the Executive and Legislative
branches. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507
(Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. 2006). Nonetheless, "there seems little doubt that judges are
government actors and that judicial remedies are [S]tate action." Erwin Chemerinsky, State
Action, 618 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES - LITIGATION 183, 209 (1999). This article refers to State action in the
literal sense and not in the more limited sense defined by the scope of the State action
doctrine.
7 This is not a novel observation. As the quote under the title of this article indicates,
Friedrich Hayek not only understood that contractual enforcement involves the exercise of
State coercion, he also thought it should be the starting point for a libertarian theory of
contracts. See HAYEK, supra note 1, at 230. In fact, modern libertarian scholars have also
sought to justify the use of State coercion in contractual enforcements. See, e.g., ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 14-15 (1974); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 15 (1998). The implications for the
substance of contract law have yet to be fully explored. See generally Donald J. Smythe,
Liberty at the Borders ofPrivate Law, 49 AKRON L. REv. 1, 37-58 (2015), for a preliminary
effort to explore implications for the substance of contract law.
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impinges on liberty.
If the fundamental purpose of the State is to advance liberty,
contract law requires justification. The theoretical justification for
having contract law is important because it provides a basis for
analyzing contract rules and doctrines. A fully developed libertarian
theory of contracts should not only explain why contract law is
necessary to advance liberty, but should also provide a basis for
analyzing how specific contract rules and doctrines should be interpreted
and applied to advance liberty. This article attempts to offer such a
theory.
One does not have to be a libertarian to appreciate a libertarian
perspective on contract law. Most people place great value on their
liberty, and even if they would make significant trade-offs between their
liberty and other rights that they value, an analysis focused on the
relationships between liberty and contract rules and doctrines should
help make those trade-offs clearer. Of course, a libertarian theory of
contract law may also offer new insights into the ways in which contract
rules and doctrines advance or impede liberty.
Much of the libertarian scholarship about contracts seems to
overlap so much with utilitarian theories of contract that the libertarian
thought often seems indistinguishable from utilitarianism.8 The most
distinctive stream of modem libertarian thought proposes a "title-transfer
theory of contracts." 9 The title theory treats contracts as transfers of title
rather than as legally enforceable promises, and it regards refusals to
perform contractual obligations as thefts of property.' 0 The use of State
coercion to enforce contracts is therefore justified because it is used to
prevent a theft. There are problems, however, with the title theory. Since
many libertarians and free market advocates tend to regard private
property rights as absolute, the view that a contract is a transfer of title
inclines some to believe in the strict enforcement of all voluntary
agreements." This is problematic, as proponents of the title theory
8 Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENv. L. REv. 75, 79 (2010).
See N. Stephen Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding
Promises, and Inalienability, 17 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11, 21 (2003). See also MURRAY
N. ROTHBARD, Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY
133-47 (Humanities Press Inc. 1982); Williamson M. Evers, Toward a Reformulation of the
Law o{Contracts, I J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 3, 7, 10 (1977).
As Murray Rothbard explained, "Failure to fulfill contracts must be considered as theft
of the other's property." MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 177 (1962). See
also, Kinsella, supra note 9, at 21-22.
1 ROTHBARD, supra note 9, at 133. Support for strict enforcement of voluntary
agreements is probably much stronger among free market advocates than among libertarians.
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themselves have explained. 12 Moreover, the title theory does not justify
contractual enforcements of promises, unless the promises effect
transfers of property. 13 This is awkward and probably too limiting.
Finally, the title theory does not, by itself, help to distinguish which
agreements actually transfer title and which agreements do not. This can
make the title theory seem confounding and even tautological because an
agreement is legally enforceable only if it transfers title, but an
agreement cannot transfer title unless it is legally enforceable.
Professor Randy Barnett has made important contributions to the
title-or as he puts it, the "entitlement"-approach to contracts by
articulating the role of consent in legitimizing entitlement transfers and
helping to distinguish those that are contractually enforceable from those
that are not. 14 There is no doubt that consent plays an important role in
legitimizing modem contractual enforcements, and Professor Barnett's
insights have therefore made important contributions to this article.
From the perspective offered here, however, there are limitations to a
consent-based theory of contracts. Perhaps most importantly, the consent
theory does not explain why a court should use the power of State
coercion to enforce a contract at all. If the purpose of the State is to
minimize the exercise of coercion, why should the State itself use
coercion to enforce a contract? Without more, the consent theory seems
to depend on an assumption that the State's purpose is not simply to
minimize the exercise of coercion, but includes something else-at the
very least, the purpose of enforcing consensual transfers of entitlements.
This article attempts to offer a more complete and systematic
analysis of the relationship between liberty and specific contract rules
and doctrines. The article presumes that the sole purpose of the State is
to advance liberty, which is tantamount under the definition of liberty it
uses to minimizing the exercise of coercion, including coercion by the
State.15 Although consent may make the exercise of State coercion less
For example, the 2016 Index of Economic Freedom, compiled jointly by The Heritage
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, defines economic freedom in part according to the
protections accorded to private property and the "efficient" enforcement of contracts. 2016
Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUND. & WALL ST. J.,
http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
12 Murray Rothbard, for example, argues that only contracts under which the failure to
enforce would be tantamount to theft should be legally enforceable. ROTHBARD, supra note 9,
at 133.
"Id. at 133-39.
14 See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296-99
(1986); see also BARNETT, supra note 7, at 77.
Is To be more precise, under the terms used here, the advancement of liberty is
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worrisome, this article does not presume that court enforcements of
consensual agreements are any less coercive than court enforcements of
non-consensual agreements. In that respect, this article attempts to offer
a more coherent libertarian analysis. Moreover, since this article draws
on a different tradition of libertarian thought, rather than title theory
alone, it may also serve to stimulate-or provoke-further libertarian
thought. 16
Any serious discussion of liberty should begin with a definition of
the term. Scholars have debated the virtues of alternative conceptions of
liberty, with some favoring narrow-or "negative" conceptions-and
others favoring broader-or "positive"-conceptions." Negative
conceptions of liberty typically define it in terms of what individuals
enjoy freedom from, whereas positive conceptions of liberty tend to
define it in terms of what individuals may enjoy the freedom to do.'8
Negative conceptions of liberty tend to boil the definition down to what
is minimally required for a free society, whereas positive conceptions of
liberty are more expansive.' 9 Although prominent libertarian scholars
have reasoned from markedly different conceptions of liberty,20 there is
probably little disagreement among most scholars-and most people-
about the desirability of being free from the exercise of coercion by
others. It is reasonable to surmise that there is probably the greatest
consensus about what liberty most minimally requires.
In the pursuit of the broadest consensus possible, this article defines
liberty in a minimalist sense and outlines what might be called a
tantamount to minimizing the exercise of coercion subject to the need to respect individuals'
spheres of personal autonomy and privacy.
6 This article shares some of the same presumptions and dispositions as those articulated
by Professor Bruce Benson. See BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW (1990).
Benson's book drew primarily on economic theory to advance understanding of the
possibilities for "privatizing" the law. See id. at 349-78 for a general discussion.
1 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvi-lxiii (1969), for an
overview of some of the controversies. As Berlin observes, neither narrow nor broad
conceptions of liberty are either inviolable or sufficient. Id. at lx. Yet he also observes that
"those who have ever valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to choose . .. is
an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human." Id.
18 See BERLIN, supra note 17, at xliii (framing the distinction between positive and
negative liberty through the questions "Who is master?" and "Over what area am I master?").
1 Id. at xliv (discussing how positive liberty expanded from the concept of negative
liberty.
See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein, Mere Libertarianism: Blending Hayek and Rothbard, 27
REASON PAPERS, Fall 2004, at 7-11 for a comparative analysis of Murray Rothbard and
Friedrich Hayek. As Klein observes, almost any conception of liberty is ambiguous and
therefore ill-defined. Id. at 7.
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minimalist libertarian theory of contracts.21 As Friedrich Hayek's quote
at the outset suggests, the article is distinctly Hayekian in motivation and
spirit. Thus, following Hayek, the article defines liberty to require that
individuals2 2 be as free as possible from the exercise of coercion by
others, and that they have a sphere of personal autonomy and privacy
within which they are free from intrusions by the State. 23 Following
Hayek again, coercion is defined to mean the control of the environment
or circumstances of a person to the extent that she is forced to serve the
ends of another. Such coercion can be exercised through the direct use of
force or merely the threat of direct force.24
Since contractual enforcements by courts involve the exercise of
coercion by the State, it is difficult to justify contract law if the sole
objective of the State is to minimize the exercise of coercion. 25 In fact,
modem attempts to justify contract law are often "speculative and
rationalistic" 26  when a more empirical, although perhaps less
philosophically coherent, theory is warranted.27 Part II critiques the most
prevalent modem theories of contract and offers a more empirical, and
arguably more compelling, justification-one rooted in an understanding
21 The use of the indefinite article is deliberate. The author does not mean to suggest that
this article offers the only possible "minimalist" libertarian theory of contracts.
22 The term "individual" is used in this article exclusively to mean natural persons, as
opposed to corporate persons.
23 The first part of this definition of liberty is from Friedrich Hayek's observation that
liberty is "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is
possible ..... HAYEK, supra note 1, at 11. The second part is from Hayek's further
observations that
[cloercion . .. cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is by
the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring the
monopoly of coercion on the [Sltate and by attempting to limit this power of the
[S]tate . . .. This is possible only by the [S]tate's protecting known private
spheres ....
Id. at 21.
24 Hayek defines coercion as "[S]uch control of the environment or circumstances of a
person by another that, in order to avoid great evil, he is forced to act not according to a
coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another." Id.
25 Since liberty is defined to mean freedom from the exercise of coercion by others,
including the State, subject to having a sphere of personal autonomy and privacy that is free
from intrusions by the State, stating that the objective of the State is to minimize the exercise
of coercion is technically inaccurate. To be precise, the objective of the State is to minimize
the exercise of coercion subject to the constraint that the State must respect individuals'
private spheres.
26 See HAYEK, supra note 1, at 54.
27 See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 78-79. Freyfogle argues that most libertarian scholars
ultimately depend on consequentialist arguments to justify private laws. Of course, some
scholars do so more explicitly than others.
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of the role that private law played in primitive legal systems, and was
suggested by Hayek himself.2 8 As the discussion elaborates, there is a
stronger justification for contractual enforcements in primitive societies
than there is in highly developed ones. Modem contract theories, which
have narrowed the range of enforceable promises to those that manifest
the intent of parties to commit themselves to legally enforceable
bargains, have served to limit contractual enforcements and,
consequently, the exercise of State coercion. The most important
question is whether contract rules and doctrines can be developed and
modified to advance liberty even further.
Part III discusses the implications of a minimalist libertarian
justification for contracts and provides an analysis of several important
contract rules and doctrines. From a minimalist libertarian perspective,
contract rules and doctrines should help to minimize the need for
contractual enforcements by facilitating "relational agreements," which
are agreements that are largely, if not entirely, enforced by the parties
themselves. To that end, there is an important role in contract law for the
statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, the use of mercantile practices
and customs in interpreting or supplementing ambiguous contracts, and
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods. Doctrines such
as unconscionability, impracticability, and the unenforceability of
agreements that are against public policy may also help to militate
against the inappropriate exercise of State coercion. Part IV provides a
brief conclusion to the article.
II. LIBERTY AND CONTRACT THEORY
A. Liberty, Utility, and Consent
The most common justifications for contractual enforcement are
utilitarian. In fact, many libertarian theories of contract seem to be, at
heart, utilitarian. 29 Accordingly, they suffer from the same limitations as
the utilitarian theories. 3 0 From a utilitarian perspective, contractual
28 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 140-41 (discussing recognition of private property as roots of
primitive legal system).
29 Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 79. Richard Epstein, a prominent libertarian scholar, argues
that rules of private law should be devised to maximize the total value of all property
holdings. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY 79 (2011).
30 Hayek went to great lengths to denounce utilitarianism, which he characterized as
being rooted in the "French rationalist tradition" of social thought founded upon idealistic
assumptions of perfectly rational behavior. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 56-61. In fact, he
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enforcements are justified when the social benefits of the enforcements
exceed the social costs associated with the exercise of coercion. The
social costs and benefits are typically defined in economic terms. But
purely libertarian values are inconsistent with the idea of trade-offs
between individuals' liberty and the end values served by their contracts.
From a minimalist libertarian perspective, social welfare is always
greater when social outcomes are achieved with the minimum exercise
of coercion possible than when they are achieved with the exercise of
any amount of coercion greater than that, regardless of the ends
achieved. Any justification of contract law that is based on utilitarian
considerations must assume that the role of the State is not to minimize
the exercise of coercion but to maximize utility. Since the minimization
of coercion is not equivalent to the maximization of utility, a utilitarian
justification of contract law is not libertarian, at least not in a minimalist
sense.
Some libertarian scholars justify contractual enforcement on the
grounds that the parties to a contract voluntarily assent to subject
themselves to the State's power of coercion. 3 1 To the extent that the
parties consent to bind themselves to contractual enforcements, when
courts enforce the parties' contract, they merely enforce the parties'
intentions and will. 32 By binding themselves to a legally enforceable
contract, the parties are able to enjoy even greater freedom, since they
can then trade their private property and other rights in return for private
property and rights owned by others that are of greater value to them.3 3
The consensual justification of contracts is probably an essential element
of any modem theory of contract, but from the perspective offered here
it is incomplete because it assumes that the purpose of the State is not
simply to minimize the exercise of coercion, but includes, in addition, an
obligation to enforce the intent and will of parties who consent to bind
themselves to a legally enforceable agreement.
In fact, both the utilitarian and the consent justifications are what
Hayek referred to as "speculative and rationalistic" rather than
sounded a warning about utilitarian reasoning: "Those who believe that all useful institutions
are deliberate contrivances and who cannot conceive of anything serving a human purpose
that has not been consciously designed are almost of necessity enemies of freedom." Id. at 61.
31 See Barnett, supra note 14, at 319.
32 id.
3 As Friedrich Hayek observed, "The rules of property and contract are required to
delimit the individual's private sphere wherever the resources or services needed for the
pursuit of his aims are scarce and must, in consequence, be under the control of some man or
other." HAYEK, supra note 1, at 141.
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empirical.34 And without some important qualifications, they both imply
that the State should enforce many agreements that would undermine the
liberty of at least one party to the agreement. For example, both theories
imply that courts should enforce a voluntary agreement under which one
party sells himself into slavery in return for a payment of money
(perhaps to be made to a family member). They also seem to imply
that courts should enforce an agreement between neighbors establishing
racially restrictive covenants (in the case of the utilitarian theory, of
course, as long as the joint economic surplus earned by the neighbors
exceeds the decrease in economic surplus to others).36 But any theory of
contracts that justifies slavery or racially restrictive covenants seems
incongruous with liberty. There is no justification for the use of the
State's coercive powers to enforce a transaction that would result in
someone becoming the slave of another and thus subject to the other's
coercion, or for someone to use the State's coercive powers not only to
serve as the instrumentality for racism and discrimination but also to
limit the liberty of others by preventing them from engaging in a
voluntary transaction for the purchase of real property.
Both theories raise other, perhaps even more fundamental,
problems. The utilitarian justification of contracts, for example, seems to
imply that a unilateral promise should be enforced if the costs to the
promisor of fulfilling the promise are less than the benefits to the
promisee of having the promise fulfilled. It would be onerous-if not
impossible 38-for courts to engage in such a cost-benefit calculation on
a case-by-case basis, and it seems impossible to determine, as a general
3 Id. at 54.
3s Robert Nozick has argued that people should have the right to sell themselves into
slavery. See NOzICK, supra note 7, at 331. Other libertarians typically argue that title to one's
self is inalienable. See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 9, at 135. Unfortunately, their arguments
can seem tautological-e.g. an agreement to transfer title to one's self is not legally
enforceable because one cannot legally convey title in one's self. BARNETT, supra note 7, at
81. Barnett offers an argument that is not tautological, but it seems to make significant
qualifications to the consent theory-he argues that a person cannot surrender her right to
change her mind in the future about whether to transfer her rights in herself to another. See
also Smythe, supra note 7, at 16-18 (arguing that the State prohibiting selling oneself into
slave uses State coercion to interfere with a voluntary private transaction).
For example, Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1368 (1981). This is not to suggest that he would
support the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, but without further qualification or
limitation, that appears to be the implication.
37 See Smythe, supra note 7, at 16-18, 34-35.
38 Hayek was highly skeptical about the capacity of human beings to make such rational
calculations. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 54-58.
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matter, whether the cost-benefit calculation would be positive or
negative. 3 9 The consent justification of contracts, on the other hand,
implies that if a person has the intent and will to make (and fulfill) a
promise, then the State should enforce that promise, regardless of
whether the promise is unilateral or made in return for consideration.
Without further qualification, the consent justification for contracts fails
to draw any distinction between a contract and a promise. In that respect,
it seems to prove too much. It would imply that courts should enforce
many kinds of promises that they do not, such as engagement promises,
intra-familial promises, and promises against public policy.
Neither the utilitarian nor the consent justifications of contract
alone therefore provide an adequate basis for a minimalist libertarian
theory of contracts. In fact, it is doubtful that any ahistorical,
philosophically grounded theories can provide an adequate basis for
understanding and analyzing contract doctrines that have evolved and
adapted to address nuanced, real-world problems in changing social and
political contexts. It is ironic that modern libertarian scholars have been
drawn to "rationalistic" theories. Hayek, one of the most influential
libertarian scholars of the twentieth century, went to great lengths to
reject the "French rationalist tradition" in social thought, and advocated
instead for the more "empirical British tradition" of classical liberal
thought. 4 0 Hayek believed that law was the product of history and social
evolution rather than rational calculation. Given that some of the British
political economists who influenced Hayek also influenced the
development of modern anthropological thought,4 1 the obvious place to
look, therefore, for a minimalist libertarian-or Hayekian, if one
prefers-theory of contract law, is in anthropological research and
scholarship on the role of private law in primitive societies.42
3 Some have argued that an award of damages could be devised to ensure that contracts
are only breached when it is efficient for them to be breached, but that argument rests on too
many assumptions to persuade most contract scholars. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory ofEfficient Breach, and the Indifference
Princigle in Contract Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 975, 997-1014 (2005).
HAYEK, supra note 1, at 56-61.
41 G. P. O'Driscoll, Hayek and the Scots on Liberty, 30 J. PRIv. ENTERPRISE 2, 13
(2015).
2 Hayek was quite clear about the influence of anthropology on his views. As he wrote,
"modem anthropology confirms the fact that 'private property appears very definitely on
primitive levels' and that 'the roots of property as a legal principle' . . . are the very
prerequisite of any ordered action. . . ." HAYEK, supra note 1, at 140 (internal quotations
omitted).
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B. Contract's Primitive Roots
As it turns out, one does not have to look very far to see why and
how anthropological research influenced Hayek. Modem
anthropological research instructs us that the earliest forms of
government in primitive societies emerged to protect liberty-to resolve
conflicts, prevent violence and coercion, and provide peace and security,
both within and between social groups.43 It is reasonable to surmise that
disputes about failed or dishonored promises and agreements commonly
led to interpersonal conflicts in early human societies, and that primitive
legal systems evolved in part to help forestall and mitigate the inter-
personal and inter-group violence that otherwise might have resulted.4
Hayek, a remarkably erudite and accomplished scholar, drew on
anthropological research on the role of law in primitive societies in
formulating his own conceptions of law and liberty.45 It is not surprising,
therefore, that his writings share many of the presumptions and
perspectives of the anthropological research. For example, as the legal
anthropologist Adamson Hoebel explained, "the really fundamental sine
qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate
use of coercion by a socially authorized agent." 46 Hoebel recognized that
law and order depended upon the use or threat of coercion by the State,
writing: "A legal rule without coercion is a fire that does not bum, a
light that does not shine. No matter that often the force need not be
unleashed ... force is still present though latent." 4 7 Moreover, Hoebel
defined legal coercion as the "general social acceptance of physical
power, in threat or in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause,
in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time."48 Hoebel's conception of
law and his recognition of the need for State coercion coincide almost to
the letter with Hayek's conception of the law,49 which strongly reflects
the influence that the emerging field of legal anthropology had on
4 3 E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE
LEGAL DYNAMICS 26-27 (Harvard Univ. Press 1968).
44 Id.
45 Hayek cited Henry Sumner Maine and Bronislaw Malinowski, influential pioneers in
the field of legal anthropology, to support his claims that the institution of property is essential
to freedom and that it even appeared in the earliest primitive societies. HAYEK, supra note 1,
at 140.
46 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 26.
4 7 Id.
48 Id. at 27.
49 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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Hayek's scholarship.so
It is interesting, therefore, that Henry Sumner Maine, a pioneer in
the study of the development of law in primitive societies, observed that
in the earliest forms of civilization primitive tribunals emerged to
resolve disputes legally because the alternative was for the parties or
sub-groups involved to resort to violence. 5 ' Adamson Hoebel later
inferred from detailed case studies that, in primitive societies, private
disputes were commonly the source of conflict between group members,
and the laws that emerged from early dispute resolution mechanisms
were what we would consider today primarily private laws rather than
public ones.52 Although Henry Sumner Maine theorized that contractual
obligations are characteristic of modern societies whereas status-based
rules were characteristic of primitive ones, more recent research has
concluded that both status-based rules and contractual obligations were
present in primitive societies in varying degrees. 53 It seems reasonable to
surmise, therefore, that private transactional disputes caused at least
some of the conflicts that gave rise to the potential for violence in
primitive societies.
Hoebel describes the function of the law in primitive societies as
the disposition of "trouble cases," by which he seems to mean the
resolution of difficult interpersonal conflicts that might lead to violence
or threats of violence.54 Although most interpersonal disputes in modern,
developed societies do not raise the potential for significant social
disorder, in primitive societies they created the potential for "social
explosions" that might pit one kin group against another and culminate
in a "little civil war."5 5 As Hoebel explains, even a relatively minor
50 See generally G. P. O'Driscoll, supra note 41 for further evidence. As O'Driscoll
observes, the Scottish political philosophers who influenced Hayek-including David Hume,
Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith-were also influential on the development of modem
anthropology. Id. at 2. Hayek's knowledge of anthropology shaped his theories about the
evolution of social phenomena. Id. at 13.
51 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 288
(London, John Murray, Albemarle St. 1875) ("There is much reason in fact for thinking that,
in the earliest times, . . . Courts of Justice existed less for the purpose of doing right
universally than for the purpose of supplying an alternative to the violent redress of wrong.").
52 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 28.
53 See Norbert Rouland, Criticism ofMaine's Theory, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A
READER 22 (Sally Falk Moore ed., Blackwell Publ'g 2005). As Rouland explains, Leopold
Prospisil, an influential legal anthropologist, has turned Maine's theories on their heads,
arguing that contractual obligations in primitive legal systems can actually precede status-
based rules. Id.
S4 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 280.
s5 Id. ("Most of the trouble-cases do not, in a civilized society, loom large on the social
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conflict between two or more individuals might have escalated and
resulted in significant violence between their larger kinship sub-
groups. 6 Of course, one potential source of such conflicts was from
transactional disputes. The resolution of transactional disputes was
probably, therefore, much more important to preventing the exercise of
coercion in primitive societies than in modem, developed societies
today.57
In the most primitive societies, law was enforced by individuals
without the need for anything like a modem State. 8 In fact, the simplest
primitive societies consisted of only a few closely related families and
the communities were comprised of no more than a small kindred
group.59 Although such a kindred group might have belonged to a tribe
in an ethnological sense, communities were typically autonomous and
not subordinate to any form of tribal government. Social relations were
typically personal and economic resources were typically shared by all.
Law and order was maintained primarily through informal mechanisms
of social control, facilitated by strong family and kinship ties.62 On
certain occasions, however, an individual would take action to enforce
rights or take retribution against others.6 ' But when an individual acted
in accordance with community norms to enforce rights or take
retribution against another, that individual exercised coercion to enforce
the law, implicitly acting as a public official.64 If the community
implicitly acknowledged that the exercise of coercion by the wronged
individual was in accordance with community norms, and in that sense,
"lawful," and restrained the wrongdoer from retaliating, then law and
social order prevailed over interpersonal violence. 65
There was little need for even rudimentary forms of government in
very simple societies in which there were strong interpersonal
scene ... [but] in a primitive society the individual case always holds the threat of a little civil
war if procedure breaks down, for from its inception it sets kin group against kin group-and
if it comes to fighting the number of kinsmen who will be involved is almost always
immediately enlarged...").
56 Id.
57Id.
58 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 50.
59 Id. at 293.
'o.Id at 293-94.
61 Id. at 294.
62 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 294-95.
63 Id. at 50.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 276.
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relationships between group members and economic resources were
commonly shared. 66 The need for more formal mechanisms of social
control increased as primitive societies developed and engaged in more
sophisticated, highly organized hunting practices. 67 In these more
advanced societies, kinship groups would come into more contact with
one another and frequently consolidated into larger groups, which
created the need for a more centralized political structure. 68 The political
leader of the consolidated group would then begin to take on the
characteristics of a chief, and the political structure would begin to take
on the characteristics of a rudimentary State. The full fruition of the law,
however, did not begin until horticultural societies developed.
Horticultural societies allowed political leaders to maintain control over
wider geographic areas as well as more people, which both facilitated
and necessitated further development of the law and legal systems. 6 9
As Hoebel summarized,
[W]ithin loosely organized tribes in which the local group is autonomous,
trouble involving members of different local groups frequently brews physical
violence which often leads to feuding; feud marks an absence of law .. . yet it
appears that every society has some set procedure for avoiding feud or
bringing it to a halt; among the more organized tribes on the higher levels of
economic and cultural growth feud is frequently prohibited by the action of a
70
central authority representing the total social interest .... .
One can, of course, properly refer to such a central authority as a State.
One might worry, however, that although such a central authority might
nominally represent the "total social interest," it might, in fact, be
influenced by some social interests more than others.7
Anthropological research thus implies that law and legal
enforcement preceded the emergence of the modem State, and it
66 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 294.
67 Id at 309.
68 Id.69 Id at 316.
70 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 330.
7 This is one of the inveterate libertarian (and non-libertarian) concerns about vesting a
monopoly on the use of coercion in the State. Hayek believed that the rule of law and the
concept of a limited government arose during the Middle Ages in England as a check against
the newly asserted power of the English Parliament to create laws by statute. HAYEK, supra
note 1, at 167-70. Hayek embraced the principles of constitutional government, observing that
"no person or body of persons has complete freedom to impose on the rest whatever laws it
likes." Id. at 181. He wrote that, "A free society . . . needs permanent means of restricting the
powers of government, no matter what the particular objective of the moment may be." Id. at
182.
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emerged because it was necessary to forestall or mitigate violence or
threats of violence resulting from interpersonal conflicts and disputes.
Such conflicts probably often arose from disputes about the nature and
extent of the parties' obligations under some agreement, or the failure of
one or both parties to meet their obligations under such an agreement.
Therefore, the precursor to modem contract law originated from the
social need to forestall and/or mitigate the exercise of coercion. When an
individual, acting in accordance with community norms, exacted some
form of retribution or took some form of compensation from another
group member, that individual exercised coercion in a public capacity,
and the behavior defined some primitive form of law. 72 As primitive
societies developed, so too did the need for more sophisticated forms of
social control. Consequently, a rudimentary form of government
emerged and a primitive precursor to a State assumed a monopoly over
the legitimate exercise of coercion. To the extent that State officials
made consistent decisions to resolve such disputes, a rudimentary body
of law was defined.
There are some clear implications for the relationship between
contract law and liberty. Anthropological research suggests that the use
of State coercion to enforce contractual obligations evolved, in part, to
prevent the exercise of even greater coercion between the individuals
who were parties to private transactional disputes. Thus, the exercise
of State coercion to enforce contracts-and other private law-was
* 74necessary to minimize the exercise of coercion in society overall.
Accordingly, there is really no need for any philosophical justification of
contract law-or private law generally-because the original purpose of
contract law was to advance liberty directly. Although private disputes
are less likely to lead to interpersonal violence in highly developed
societies, if the State suddenly declined to adjudicate private
transactional disputes there would almost certainly be wide-ranging
adverse social consequences.75 Commerce would be significantly
72 "The privilege of applying force constitutes the official element in law. He who is
generally or specifically recognized as rightly exerting the element of physical coercion is a
splinter of social authority." HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 27 (internal quotations omitted).
n See id. at 26-27 (discussing anthropological research).
74 "[S]ome government coercion might be more than compensated for by the consequent
reductions in non-governmental coercion." Klein, supra note 20, at 17. Klein expresses
skepticism about the usefulness of such arguments because they necessitate "the incorporation
of theories of-or at least predictions about-social processes, about which we might disagree
or in which we simply [do] not have any confidence." Id.
7 HOEBEL, supra note 43, at 280.
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disrupted and interpersonal violence or other forms of coercion would
probably rise. A developed society that ceased to enforce contract laws
altogether would almost certainly regress, and liberty would be
impaired.
C. Adaptive Evolution and Ordered Liberty
Once a body of contract law has been established, individuals will
naturally rely on it to advance their own interests. As Hayek observes,
when the private legal rules are known and clear, individuals will subject
themselves to the possibility of State coercion in order to pursue their
own ends.76 In the enforcement of contract laws, individuals can use
State coercion as a means to their own ends rather than allow themselves
"to be used for the ends of others." 77
Hayek believed that, historically, it was the cumulative growth of
social institutions, such as contract law, that allowed human reason and
civilization to flourish, 78 because it was "the evolution of well-
constructed institutions, where the rules and principles of contending
interests and compromised advantages would be reconciled, that had
successfully channeled individual efforts to socially beneficial aims."7 9
Thus, Hayek argued, "the indispensable foundation for the argument for
liberty"80 is not to be found in "the Cartesian conception of an
independently existing human reason that invented . .. institutions"81 but
in "the emergence of order as the result of an adaptive evolution." 82
This may be why Hayek had so few quibbles with contract law.
Hayek viewed contract law as a tool that individuals could use to
construct private spheres within which they could enjoy their personal
freedoms. 8 3 As he observed, "[s]ince coercion is the control of the
76 "Coercion according to known rules, which is generally the result of circumstances in
which the person to be coerced has placed himself, then becomes an instrument assisting the
individuals in the pursuit of their own ends and not a means to be used for the ends of others."
HAYEK, supra note 1, at 21.
77 Id.
78 Hayek cites Hume, Ferguson, and others for insight into "how institutions and morals,
language and law, have evolved by a process of cumulative growth and that it is only with and
within this framework that human reason has grown and can successfully operate." Id. at 57.
79 Id. at 60.
s
0HAYEK, supra note 1, at 57.
8 1 Id.
82 Id. at 59.
83 As Hayek explained:
That other people's property can be serviceable in the achievement of our aims is
due mainly to the enforceability of contracts. The whole network of rights created
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essential data of an individual's actions by another, it can be prevented
only by enabling the individual to secure for himself some private sphere
where he is protected against such interference." 8 4 Free individuals
should have the right to decide what to include within their private
spheres. Property law largely defines the private spheres that
individuals begin with, and contract law enables them to trade with
others for property and other rights that they would like to have under
their autonomous control. To that end, contract law must be applied
impartially and with as little judicial discretion as possible. 87
Thus, for Hayek, "freedom of contract" meant a kind of ordered
liberty. An individual enjoyed freedom of contract as long as she was
free from the arbitrary exercise of coercion because contract rules and
doctrines were known and applied equally and impartially. As Hayek
explained:
Freedom of contract, like freedom in all other fields, really means that the
permissibility of a particular act depends only on general rules and not on its
specific approval by authority. It means that the validity and enforceability of a
contract must depend only on those general, equal, and known rules by which
all other legal rights are determined and not on the approval of its particular
content by an agency of the government. This does not exclude the possibility
of the law's recognizing only those contracts which satisfy certain general
conditions or of the [S]tate's laying down rules for the interpretation of
contracts which will supplement the explicitly agreed terms. The existence of
such recognized standard forms of contract which, so long as no contrary terms
are stipulated, will be presumed to be part of the agreement often greatly
facilitates private dealings.8 8
Thus, contract doctrines that void contract clauses, excuse parties
by contracts is as important a part of our protected sphere, as much the basis of our
own plans, as any property of our own.
Id. at 141.
84 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 139.
" Id. at 139-40.
86 As Hayek explains, "The rules of property and contract are required to delimit the
individual's private sphere wherever the resources or services needed for the pursuit of his
aims are scarce and must, in consequence, be under the control of some man or another." Id.
at 141.
8 Hayek wrote:
It is because the lawgiver does not know the particular cases to which his rules will
apply, and it is because the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing the
conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the particular facts of
the case, that it can be said that laws and not men rule.
Id. at 153.
88 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 230.
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from obligations, or fill gaps in their writings are consistent with
freedom of contract.
D. The Hayekian Project
Although Hayek had few quibbles with contract law, he was
emphatically not conservative and would have rejected any suggestion
that the law should remain static. 89 As he observed, the problem with
conservatism is that
by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are
moving. It may succeed by its resistance to current tendencies in slowing down
undesirable developments, but, since it does not indicate another direction, it
cannot prevent their continuance. It has, for this reason, invariably been the
90fate of conservatism to be dragged along a path not of its own choosing.
Hayek therefore believed that, even though improvements in the law are
bound to be slow once the basic parameters of a free society have been
established, 9' there is still "ample scope for experimentation and
improvement within . .. [the] legal framework" which will enable a free
society to become even better.92 Thus, the central question is not
whether contract law can be improved; it is about how contract law can
be improved. In other words, it is about the direction of change, not
whether change is desirable-change is inevitable because the law
cannot remain static. Although Hayek did not himself suggest the
direction in which contract law should be taken, the main thrust of his
life's work implies that contract law should be refined to make people
even freer and thus increase their liberty further.
Given that private transactional disputes are less likely to result in
interpersonal violence, the possibility for refinements and improvements
in contract law should increase as societies develop. There should be
opportunities to lessen the reliance on State coercion to enforce private
agreements and arbiter private transactional disputes. Of course, if the
scope of contract law is to be narrowed, there would probably have to be
ancillary developments in social philosophy and jurisprudence that help
to justify more refined contract rules and doctrines. It would be a
89 See, e.g., Hayek's famous essay, "Why I am not a Conservative," included as a
postscript in Id. at 398.
90 Id.
9
' Id. at 231.
92 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 231.
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mistake to suggest that the development of American contract law has
generally been motivated and shaped by libertarian concerns, but it is at
least a happy coincidence that, broadly speaking, contract rules and
doctrines appear to have been refined in ways that advance liberty in the
United States in the modem era.
Principles of equity governed the common law approach to
contracts. Promises were generally enforceable, regardless of whether
they were made as part of a bargain. 9 3 In the United States prior to the
nineteenth century, these principles manifested themselves in the rule
that "a sound price warrants a sound commodity." 94 The sound price rule
authorized courts to inquire into the adequacy of consideration, which
injected uncertainty into commercial contracts right at the onset of a
significant expansion in commercial activity when commercial contracts
were becoming more prevalent and complex.95 In the face of new
circumstances and pressures, however, courts eventually began to shift
from regulating the equity of commercial transactions to upholding the
will of the parties.9 6 The doctrine of caveat emptor began to replace the
sound price rule and consideration was made pre-requisite to a legally
enforceable contract.9 7 Modem contract law thus began to revolve
around a bargain theory and the parties' intent and will to commit to a
mutually beneficial, legally enforceable exchange. 98
The modem shift in contract jurisprudence to focus on the intent
and will of the parties and the requirement that a contract have
consideration narrowed the range of promises that courts can enforce. As
9 At early common law, courts of law would only enforce promises "under seal,"
regardless of whether they were made as part of a bargain. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL.,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 311-12 (2009). In the face of pressure to enforce unsealed promises, Chancery
courts established jurisdiction over contracts and began enforcing them in equity. Id. at 320-
22. Promises were broadly enforced in Chancery courts, which followed a simple formula:
"promises have to be kept . .. as long as they do not violate the laws of God and reason, that
is, unless they are against good conscience themselves." Id. at 311, citing Franz Metzger, The
Last Phase of the Medieval Chancery, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH
HISTORY 84 (Alan Harding ed., 1980).
94 Morton Horowitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 917, 926 (1974).
95 Courts' reliance on principles of equity mirrored a preindustrial economy in which it
was possible to identify "customary prices" for most commodities. As commercial activities
expanded and became more complex, contract law began to assume a different role. Id. at 936.
96 Horowitz observed that the turn away from "regulating the equity of agreements"
began in England during Lord Mansfield's time and continued throughout the nineteenth
century. Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 946.
98 Horowitz, supra note 94, at 947.
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a result, the shift narrowed the use of State coercion to enforce private
transactions. In fact, the intent of the parties and the consideration
requirement operate as separate filters, each weeding out from the set of
enforceable agreements a subset. The intent and will of the parties is
manifest in an offer and acceptance. If there is no offer and acceptance,
an agreement will not be enforceable, even if there is consideration.99
Consideration is manifest in evidence of an exchange, whether it is an
exchange of property for a price or an exchange of promises. In the
absence of a true bargain, an agreement is not legally enforceable even if
the parties did manifest their intentions to be bound. The requirement
that the parties intend to make a bargain thus narrows the range of
contractually enforceable promises more than either the intent and will
requirement or the consideration requirement would by themselves. It
may have been through happenstance, but the general drift of modem
contract law has been towards limiting the use of State coercion to
enforce private transactions.
Of course, the scope of modem contract law remains exceptionally
broad. That should not be surprising: although transactional disputes
might be less likely to result in violence and disorder in more developed
societies, the abolition of contract law would almost certainly cause
society to unravel. It would undermine the cornerstones of ordered
liberty by forcing people to plan their affairs and make decisions in an
uncertain and unstable legal environment. Even from a minimalist
libertarian perspective, therefore, there is still a need for contract law in
any free society, and innovations in contract law need to be made
incrementally to preserve liberty.
But the justification for retaining an established body of contract
law does not exempt contract law from the kinds of scrutiny that
typically apply to other ways in which the State exercises coercion. In
fact, since contract rules and doctrines are created by statutes or case
precedents, and since legislatures and courts are State actors, it is only
natural to ask, on whose behalf do the rules and doctrines serve?
Research and scholarship across a wide range of fields, with diverse
political orientations, suggests that the law may reflect a bias in favor of
politically powerful and dominant individuals and social groups.100
9 The application of other contract doctrines that make an agreement unenforceable,
such as unconscionability or impracticability, may also reflect the absence of intent. See the
discussion, infra Part Ill.
100 A wide range of research and scholarships suggests that vested interests inordinately
influence legislatures. For example, William Shughart writes,
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Potential biases in the law create the possibility that some individuals
could use the State's power to enforce contract laws as a means of
exercising coercion against other individuals.
In the spirit of the Hayekian project, one might therefore ask, could
liberty be advanced by further limiting the role for courts in enforcing
private agreements? Beyond that, if the objective is to advance liberty
how should the existing contract rules and doctrines be developed and
applied? The next section of this article addresses questions such as
these and outlines the broader contours of a minimalist libertarian theory
of contracts.
III. CONTRACT RULES AND DOCTRINES
A. Relational Agreements
One of the ways in which contract laws can advance liberty is by
reducing the reliance on courts to enforce private agreements. This can
be accomplished in part by facilitating relational agreements. A
relational agreement is one that is typically enforced and arbitrated by
the parties themselves, possibly without the assistance of a contract or
recourse to the courts.101 In fact, relational agreements are quite
Small, homogeneous groups with strong communities of interest tend to be more
effective suppliers of political pressure and political support (votes, campaign
contributions, and the like) than larger groups whose interests are more diffuse. The
members of smaller groups have greater individual stakes in favorable policy
decisions, can organize at lower cost, and can more successfully control the free
riding that otherwise would undermine the achievement of their collective goals.
Because the vote motive provides reelection-seeking politicians with strong
incentives to respond to the demands of small, well-organized groups,
representative democracy frequently leads to a tyranny of the minority.
William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICs 429
(David R. Henderson ed., 2008). For at least a century, scholars have alleged that there are
important judicial biases. Over a century ago, Theodore Schroeder argued that judges may be
biased by "sympathies instilled by a corporation practice and other schools of
privilege ... [that make them]... predisposed to favor privileged classes. . . ." Theodore
Schroeder, Social Justice and the Courts, 22 YALE L.J. 19, 26 (1912). Scholars continue to
allege that the "the privileged socioeconomic status of judges affect[s] their decisions," but
now draw on social science research on implicit biases to support their claims. See, e.g.,
Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137,
142-52 (2013).
101 The discussion here draws a distinction between a relational agreement and a
relational contract. As the terms are used here, a "relational agreement" is an agreement of an
open-ended, ongoing nature between two or more parties which the parties themselves
typically adapt to changed circumstances and unforeseen contingencies as they arise. The term
"relational contract," on the other hand, is a contract between the parties to a relational
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common. Relational agreements sometimes arise, for example, in an
office supply arrangement in which the buyer communicates his or her
needs and the seller supplies goods without either party ever worrying
about specifying the details of the agreement in writing. 102 Depending on
the manner of their communications, the parties may or may not have a
contract; although, even if they did, it would typically be irrelevant to
their transaction.1 03 In fact, there are costs and risks associated with the
execution of a contract, which might incline parties to transact without
one. For example, there are often significant costs associated with
negotiating and drafting contract terms, and even if the terms have been
carefully drafted there are often significant costs associated with
litigating disputes, not to mention the risk that a court could hold a party
to an obligation that the party did not intend to make.1 0 4 In some cases,
therefore, the parties might intentionally prefer not to have a legally
enforceable contract. For example, a tradecontractor might prefer to rely
on its reputation to assure its customers that it will perform the agreed
work rather than make any written commitments that could be enforced
in court; its customers might be happy to rely on the contractor's
agreement. Thus, the parties to a relational agreement may execute a contract to help enforce
their agreement even though they generally adapt their obligations to changing circumstances
without asserting their formal contract rights. See Donald J. Smythe, The Role of Contractual
Enforcement and Excuse: An Economic Analysis, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 2 (2002)
for an overview.
102 See Marianne Jennings, The True Meaning of Relational Contracts: We Don't Care
About the Mailbox Rule, Mirror Images, Or Consideration Anymore-Are We Safe?, 73
DENv. U. L. REV. 3, 12-18 (1995), for a discussion of this example, as well as her
characterization of four generic types of long-term supplier relationships, ranging from the
most informal, that may proceed without a contract, to those in which the parties execute
carefully drafted, detailed writings to make their agreements as fully enforceable under
contract law as possible.
103 A relational contract is one that is executed for an agreement under which the parties
typically have ongoing obligations that are adapted to changing circumstances as the need
arises. See Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the
Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 230-31 (2004). A
relational contract is typically incomplete because "the parties are incapable of reducing
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations." Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981). Although the
parties execute a legally enforceable contract, they do so with the understanding that the terms
of their contract will be adapted as the transaction unfolds. In that respect, their formal
contract provides only a framework within which such adaptations may occur. In some
respects, therefore, their formal contract is more like a constitution for the administration of
their agreement than a contract in the classical sense. Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 894 (1978).
104 Smythe, supra note 103, at 250.
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reputation because they expect high quality work for a modest price.
There are a variety of ways in which contract rules and doctrines
may facilitate relational agreements. For one thing, the law might
establish threshold requirement for courts to use the power of State
coercion to enforce private agreements, such as through a statute of
frauds requirement or other requirements that make obligations
contingent upon evidence of an intent to be bound. 105 The law might also
facilitate relational agreements by relaxing rules about the kind of
evidence that can be used to interpret contractual obligations. A "soft"
parol evidence rule allows oral evidence and evidence about mercantile
practices and customs to bear on the interpretation of contract terms; it
thus also frees the parties from the need to negotiate and draft detailed
written agreements. Not least of all, the law might facilitate relational
agreements by supporting the use of ADR.
1. The Statute of Frauds
A purely relational agreement might be in the best economic
interests of both parties. 0 6 More to the point of this article, it would also
avoid exposing them to the risk of State coercion in the event of a
dispute. It would therefore be a mistake for courts to intervene in
agreements that the parties would prefer to be self-enforcing. To that
end, the statute of frauds-or other contract rules that require a party to
provide evidence that the other party intended to commit itself to the risk
that a court might enforce its obligations against itl 07--helps to
distinguish agreements that are contractually enforceable from those that
are not.108 By making that distinction, it also limits the scope of the
State's power to exercise coercion in the enforcement of contracts and
105 The UCC requires that an agreement must provide a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy to be legally enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.").
106 Id.
107 id.
108 Of course, this was not the original purpose of the statute of frauds, but merely a
fortunate consequence of its enactment. The statute of frauds was originally enacted to prevent
fraudulent conveyance of real property by requiring written evidence to support claims that
title to land had been conveyed contractually. Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes
of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 354, 372-74 (1983). Many at the time
believed that the statute of frauds was first enacted to be an alternative to a centralized system
for registering title to lands that the government would have to administer. Id. at 381-82.
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therefore advances liberty.1 09 Parties that do not wish the courts to
intervene in their transactions can intentionally avoid satisfying the
statute of frauds-and/or whatever other rules serve the same purpose-
to put their transactions beyond the reach of the courts. This role for the
statute of frauds is broader than its historic role, which was to prevent
courts from enforcing obligations based on fraudulent claims of an oral
contract. 0 But that historic role also served to protect parties from the
errant exercise of State coercion.
The danger of having a rule like the statute of frauds is that it may
wreak injustice on the unsophisticated and expose them to the
malfeasance of opportunistic transacting partners. For example, a more
sophisticated party might ensure that a less sophisticated transacting
party signs a writing to make obligations enforceable against the
unsophisticated party when the sophisticated party avoids signing a
writing that would make obligations enforceable against the
sophisticated party. The unsophisticated party might have understood
that he would be subject to the risk that the courts would enforce his
obligations against him, but he may not have understood that his
transacting partner's obligations would not be enforceable against her.
Such concerns are mitigated, to some extent, by common law exceptions
to the statute of frauds that allow enforcement under the doctrines of
estoppel or part performance.11 2 For example, if the unsophisticated
party had changed his position in reliance on an oral agreement and
would suffer a detrimental injury unless the agreement was enforced, a
court could enforce the agreement under the doctrine of estoppel even
though the statute of frauds was not satisfied."'
Unfortunately, there are risks to applying the exceptions too
109 This function is not unrelated to the original purpose of the statute of frauds.
Fraudulent claims to title based on spurious claims of oral contracts would involve the
exercise of State coercion on behalf of defrauders.
110 Hamburger, supra note 108, at 371.
111 Critics of the statute of frauds have long claimed that it has been used to prevent the
enforcement of otherwise valid contracts much more frequently than it has prevented the
enforcement of invalid ones. See, e.g., Lionel Morgan Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel
Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 442 (1931) ("How many unjust suits
have been prevented as a result of the statute cannot be estimated, but the reports are filled
with cases where just claims have been defeated by its operation.")
112 Courts carved out significant exceptions to respond to the misuses of the statute. Id. at
458-59. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes a doctrine of part performance in
Section 129. See David G. Epstein, Ryan D. Starbird & Joshua C. Vincent, Reliance on Oral
Promises: Statute of Frauds and Promissory Estoppel, 42 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 913, 930-32
(2010) for a recent overview.
113 Summers, supra note 111, at 445-46.
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broadly. If the parties intentionally chose not to sign a writing so that
courts could not intervene, the application of the estoppel doctrine might
allow one of the parties to use State coercion against the other
opportunistically. Therefore, exceptions to the statute of frauds should
be construed narrowly.1 14 In fact, before an exception is applied, courts
should look for evidence that the party seeking to have the exception
applied reasonably did not understand that the failure to satisfy the
statute of frauds would make the other party's obligations
unenforceable.115 Such evidence might be provided by 1) the relative
lack of sophistication of the party,11 6 and/or 2) the absence of any non-
legal methods of enforcing the obligations.' 17  Examples of such
evidence might be the tit-for-tat interactions inherent in an ongoing,
repeated transactional relationship or the emotional and moral suasion
inherent in a family relationship or close friendship."'8 Absent such
evidence, courts should be cautious about applying exceptions to respect
and preserve the ability of parties to opt out of contractual enforcement
in the courts at the outset of their transactions.
The statute of frauds imposes transaction costs on contracting
parties. Even if the writing necessary to satisfy the statute is minimal, in
many transactions, the need to execute a writing in and of itself is an
inconvenience. When the stakes are small, the parties might not bother,
even though they would prefer to have a legally enforceable contract.
Perhaps even more likely, if the stakes are small, the seller might prefer
not to have a legally enforceable contract, even though the buyer would.
For example, in a sale of a small consumer item-a bottle of milk or a
114 If anything, it seems the exceptions have been applied far too broadly. Id. at 448
("[P]resent-day courts are practically unanimous in applying estoppel to validate contracts
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.").
115 Conversely, the question is whether the party seeking enforcement understood that the
other party did not intend to commit to contractual enforcement of its obligations.
1 An unsophisticated party might not understand the legal effect of the statute of frauds
whereas a more sophisticated one normally would. A party who knew the legal consequences
of not getting the other to sign a writing that provided evidence of his obligations would be
hard pressed to explain why he thought the other intended to have those obligations enforced
against him in a court of law.
117 A party would be much more likely to transact without the safeguard provided by legal
enforcement if there were ample non-legal methods of ensuring the other party complied with
the agreement.
1 For classic discussions of the non-legal governance options for transactions, see
MacNeil, supra note 103, at 856-65; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1093-94 (1981); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON.
233, 248-49 (1979).
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can of soda-the buyer might like to have contract remedies against the
seller (if she thought about them), but the seller would probably prefer
that the buyer not have them. Given the inconvenience, the parties would
normally not bother executing a signed document. In such cases,
however, it would be best if the statute of frauds did not apply.119 Since
the statute might impose transaction costs disproportionate to the size of
the potential surplus that the transaction could generate, most reasonable
parties would not want to comply even if they would prefer that their
agreements be legally enforceable. An alternative default rule might be
appropriate for such transactions. For example, a writing could be
required to prove the intent of the parties to opt out of contractual
enforcement rather than to opt in.
The analysis has a number of implications that can be summarized
as follows: A statute of frauds requirement should 1) not apply to small-
stakes transactions; 2) not apply indiscriminately to transactions between
a sophisticated party and an unsophisticated one, such as a merchant-
consumer sale of goods; and 3) be subject to exceptions, such as the
doctrines of estoppel and part performance; but 4) the exceptions should
only be applied when i) the party seeking performance is relatively
unsophisticated and ii) there are few, if any, non-legal methods available
for the parties to use to enforce their obligations. There are typically
only significant non-legal methods for the parties to use to enforce their
obligations if they have an ongoing relationship of some kind; this
would normally be the case only if they were relational transacting
partners or family members.
2. Parol Evidence
Most contract disputes raise questions about the appropriate
interpretation of the contract terms. 120 The resolution of the disputes
usually depends on which evidence a court will consider in interpreting
the contract terms. 12 This can make the application of the parol
11 As a practical matter, it would not apply. Under the UCC Section 2-201(1) a signed
writing is required to enforce a contract for the sale of goods only if the price of the goods is
$500 or more. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
120 George Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 125-26 (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
121 Questions about contract interpretation and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence are
often conflated, but they are distinct. See generally Margaret N. Kniffin, Conflating and
Confusing Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing
Someone Else's Clothes?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 75 (2009).
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evidence rule dispositive. Some scholars have argued that, when the
parties are sophisticated, courts should apply a "hard" parol evidence
rule-that is, they should apply the parol evidence rule strictly and rely
on the plain meaning of the parties' writing to interpret the terms of the
contract.1 22 This line of scholarship has been characterized as a neo-
formalistl23 movement in modem contract scholarship, and is often
rooted in neoclassical economic analysis.1 24 But it is doubtful whether
the prescriptions should apply widely enough to be of much practical
value.1 25
The terms of any contract need to be negotiated and agreed upon
using a language of some kind. Unfortunately, there are inherent
limitations on the use of language that limit the precision of contract
terms. There is no such thing as a "private" language.1 26 In other words,
since a language must be shared, it cannot consist of words that have
meanings to only the person who uses them. 127 The meanings of words
are inherently personal and they cannot therefore be understood in
precisely the same way by different people. Although the meanings of
words must be shared for any true communication to occur, they can
only be shared imperfectly and any true communication is necessarily
imperfect.1 2 8 In fact, it is not even certain that the understandings people
have of the language they use at one time will be the same as their
understandings of the same language at some later time.129
122 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 547 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics
of Costly Contracting, 20 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 2, 23, 26-27 (2004); Robert E. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 879 (2006); Jody
Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1023, 1061-62 (2009); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation
Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 932 (2010).
123 See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 869, 870-71 (2002). For a statement of the case for formalism by a so-
called "neo-formalist," see Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 848 (2000).
124 Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott describe the work as part of a larger project, "arguing
that the law should pursue the first order goal of maximizing contractual surplus when it
chooses rules to regulate merchant-to-merchant contracts." Schwartz, supra note 122, at 928.
'
25 See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 68 (2009).
126 Val D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the Contract
Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 785 (2008).
127 Id. at 787.
128 Public language cannot reflect the parties' private thoughts. Id. at 795.
129 BRIAN Bix, LAw, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 37 (1993)
("Wittgenstein ... has shown that there is no fact of the matter to prove that I mean the same
thing by my current use of a word as I did by my former use.").
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The need for the interpretation of contract language creates the need
for an "interpreter." 1 30 Neither of the contracting parties alone could act
as the interpreter, and the terms of a contract cannot be self-
interpreting. 131 In other words, the parties cannot contract in a definitive
way for the interpretation of the terms in the contract. In order to specify
how a particular right or obligation should be interpreted, they would
have to use additional language, and that language would be subject to
the same interpretive problems as the language that needed to be
interpreted. 132 Ultimately, a third party that has the authority to impose
its interpretation on the parties must interpret the contract. Since the
State has a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercion, the only
third-party with that kind of coercive authority is a court of law. Even
the contract interpretations of a private arbiter can only be enforced by a
court.
The parol evidence rule limits courts' use of extrinsic evidence in
interpreting contract terms. It thus favors the use of evidence provided
by a writing. Under the "four corners test," if a writing is unambiguous
on its face a court will exclude parol or other extrinsic evidence in
interpreting the contract terms. 13 3 But a court that relied exclusively on
the writing to interpret the contract might rule differently than a court
that relied exclusively on the parol evidence. 13 4 And a court that used
both the writing and the parol evidence to interpret the contract might
rule either way or differently still. This is problematic because, from a
purely theoretical perspective, there is no reason why a court should
favor certain kinds of language, such as the language used in writing,
over other kinds of language, such as verbal statements.
A court needs to first interpret a contract in order to determine
whether the parties meant to exclude parol evidence before it can
exclude parol evidence solely on the grounds that the contract excluded
130 Marc A. Loth, Limits of Private Law: Enriching Legal Dogmatics, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1725, 1726 (2007) (citing Wittgenstein for the proposition that rules are not self-
applymg).
13 Id. at 1726.
132 Of course, this does not mean that a merger clause or other contract term bearing on
the interpretation of the contract would be of no value to a judge or arbiter. It merely means
that such a contract term could not by itself govern the interpretation of the contract.
133 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1596-97 (2005).
134 Ricks, supra note 126, at 803 ("[T]he meaning of contractual language might be clear
within the four corners of the document but ambiguous or different outside of that context or
when more context is added.").
488 [Vol. 35:461
THE ILLIBERTY OF CONTRACT
it.' 3 1 It is illogical for a court to exclude parol evidence in interpreting
whether the parties intended the contract to exclude parol evidence. 136 If
a court did consider parol evidence, that might raise ambiguities about
the interpretation of the contract that were not evident from the writing.
Such ambiguities might also raise the possibility that two courts-or
even the same court at different times-might reach inconsistent
interpretations of the contract, especially if they applied different
versions of the parol evidence rule. 137
The parol evidence rule thus raises questions about the appropriate
exercise of State coercion. Since the party with greater economic
resources and better legal acumen usually drafts the writing used to
provide evidence of the contract terms, a strict parol evidence rule will
generally benefit dominant contracting parties at the expense of
subordinate ones. In fact, it increases the likelihood that contracts will be
ones of adhesion.' 38 Even where both parties are merchants and
ostensibly sophisticated in contracting matters, the party with more
economic and legal resources may use a standard form and the weaker
party may be given a take-it-or-leave-it offer. 139 As a general matter, the
terms of any writing are more likely to reflect the interests of the
stronger party, and a strict parol evidence rule will usually work to the
advantage of the stronger party at the expense of the weaker one.
This means that under a strict parol evidence rule, there is a greater
risk that the weaker party did not truly assent to the contract terms. The
risk implicates liberty interests because when a court enforces the terms
of a written agreement it exercises the power of State coercion. If a court
enforced contract terms that the weaker party had not truly assented to,
then the State's coercive powers would, in effect, be used against the
weaker party on behalf of the stronger party.1 40 If, on the other hand, the
135 Loth, supra note 130, at 1732 ("In legal theory it is an accepted proposition that the
application of the law, or the identification of a legal proposition, presupposes an
interpretation of the law.").
Id. This reasoning appears to have been persuasive on the drafters of the UCC. For
example, official comment 1(c) to UCC Section 2-202 rejects the idea that a court needs to
find a writing to be ambiguous before it will consider parol evidence. U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N. 2015). But many state courts apply a strict-or "hard"-
parol evidence rule under the state's common law. See, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, Bargains
Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 1475, 1522 (2010).
137 Application of a stricter parol evidence rule would obviously make the contract
interpretation reflect the written language more than any oral language.
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesions-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943).
140 Id.
14 In fact, courts that are conscious of the imbalance in the bargaining power of parties
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court declined to enforce an obligation of the stronger party because of
"fine print" in the written instrument that the stronger party drafted, even
though the weaker party believed the obligation to have been agreed
upon, then the court would, in effect, facilitate a kind of malfeasance
perpetrated by the stronger party against the weaker one.141
Unfortunately, under a strict version of the parol evidence rule, the
State's coercive powers would probably be used on behalf of powerful
and socially dominant parties and against weak and socially subordinate
ones much more commonly than they would be used on behalf of the
weak against the powerful. 142
The implication is that liberty would be advanced, in general, if
courts applied "soft" parol evidence rules rather than strict-or "hard"-
ones. As a general matter, parol evidence should be excluded only if a
preponderance of all of the available evidence-including any extrinsic
evidence-establishes that both of the parties intended for their
agreement to exclude the use of parol evidence in the interpretation of
their contract.
In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
incorporates an important role for mercantile practices and customs-
courses of performances, courses of dealings, and usages of tradel 43
the interpretation of commercial contracts. Although it uses different
terms, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG") incorporates a role for similar kinds of
have often gone to great lengths to interpret the parties' contracts equitably. Id. at 633.
141 Courts might try to interpret the contract to satisfy the weaker party's "reasonable
expectations." Id. at 637.
142 As Hayek observed:
That other people's property can be serviceable in the achievement of our aims is
due mainly to the enforceability of contracts. The whole network of rights created
by contracts is as important a part of our own protected sphere, as much the basis of
our plans, as any property of our own.
HAYEK, supra note 1, at 141. To the extent that rules of contract interpretation favored the
stronger against the weak, they might also implicate the State in helping the stronger parties to
usur the rights of the weaker parties.
43 UCC § 1-303(d) states:
A course of performance or course of dealing between the parties or usage of trade
in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties' agreement, may give
particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement, and may supplement or
qualify the terms of the agreement. A usage of trade applicable in the place in
which part of the performance under the agreement is to occur may be so utilized as
to that part of the performance.
U.C.C. § 1-303(d)(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
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evidence.144 The conventional wisdom among most commercial law
scholars has commonly been that the use of evidence about the parties'
past and present transactions and industry customs to interpret
commercial contracts has a long history in European law, and was
incorporated into the common law in part through the opinions of the
great English jurist Lord Mansfield and the influence of Blackstone's
Commentaries.145 In line with that view, commercial law scholars have
commonly thought that Mansfield's opinions and judicial philosophy,
including his insistence that mercantile practices and customs should
inform the interpretation of commercial contracts, had significant
influence on the development of American law after the American
Revolution.1 4 6
The conventional wisdom among commercial law scholars,
however, has apparently not been shared by many legal historians. In
fact, some legal historians have recently challenged the idea.147 Emily
Kadens has persuasively argued that because medieval customs were
inherently unstable and uncertain, medieval merchants frequently
wanted legislatures and courts to impose contract rules upon them rather
than find the rules governing their transactions in their mercantile
practices.148 Interestingly, however, Kadens acknowledged that
mercantile customs still played an important role in medieval
4 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 9,
Mar. 2, 1987, 52 FR 6262 [hereinafter CISGI states:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves. (2) The parties are
considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their
contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known
and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by,
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.
Id.
145 Julian S. Waterman, Mansfield and Blackstone's Commentaries, I U. CH. L. REv.
549, 564-67 (1934).
146 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 93, at 496-500.
147 See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1153,
1156-60 (2012), for an extended critique and a comprehensive summary of the literature.
Other scholars have conjectured that the proponents of the idea of the law merchant are
typically not historians and have political motivations for idealizing how a system of private
law could emerge from private behavior. See, e.g., Steven E. Sachs, From St. Ives to
Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval 'Law Merchant', 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 685, 794-803 (2006). See also Ralf Michaels, Legal Medievalism in Lex Mercatoria
Scholarship, 90 TEX. L. REV. 259 (2012) (Ralf Michaels's response to Professor Kaden).
Interestingly, Professor Kadens characterizes some of the proponents of the "myth" of the
medieval law merchant as "libertarian." KADENS, supra, at 1168.
148 Kadens, supra note 147, at 1196-97.
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commerce. 149 As she observed, "custom offered more room for equitable
development when the parties were close knit, repeat players who
wanted less imposed, enacted law and more reliance on good faith,
accommodation, and fair dealing in situations in which the risks were
more evenly shared."150 In other words, although there were many
contexts in which medieval merchants preferred that legislatures or
courts provided rules to govern their contracts, they preferred reliance on
mercantile practices and customs in addressing contracts that we would
consider relational.
Regardless of whether they influenced medieval law, the use of
mercantile practices and customs to interpret commercial contracts
would appear to support relational contracting practices. Over half a
century ago, Stewart Macaulay's seminal study of relational agreements
revealed that the parties in many ongoing business transactions were
much more fluid and flexible about their obligations than classical
contract theorists typically assumed.15 1 In fact, Macaulay found that,
even though the parties might execute a writing to provide evidence of
their obligations at the outset of their agreement, over the course of their
transaction their actual behavior would often deviate from the terms in
the writing.152 Moreover, business firms' approach to problems and
unforeseen contingencies were typically much more cooperative and
adaptive than classical contract theory implies; they would rarely, if
ever, assert formal legal rights under their contract or threaten
litigation. 153  Macaulay's early findings helped to influence the
development of relational contract theory and undermine rigid formalism
'
49 Id. at 1199.
50 Id.
151 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Macaulay continues to allege that there is
often a difference between the "real deal" and the "paper deal." See Stewart Macaulay, The
Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for
Transparent Simple Rules, 66 THE MODERN L. REV. 44, 45-47. A number of subsequent
studies have supported and supplemented his empirical observations. See infra. See generally
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEG. PLURALISM 1 (1981); Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Simon
Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Courts and Relational Contracts, 18 J.
LAW, ECON. & ORG. 221 (2002).
152 Macaulay, supra note 151. Interestingly, however, some recent research suggests that
parties to relational agreements may learn how to improve their contracting practices as they
transact over time. See generally K.J. Mayer & N. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence
from the Personal Computer Industry, 15 ORGANIZATIONAL SC. 394 (2004).
153 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 151, at 61-62.
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in contract law.15 4 Relational contract theorists typically believe that the
use of mercantile practices and customs to interpret parties' contracts
helps to ensure that the interpretations reflect parties' actual behavior
rather than writings that merely provide a legal framework for their
transactions.
Not all theorists agree. Some contract theorists argue that courts
should adopt a formalist approach to contract interpretation, even when
their agreements are clearly relational.' 5 Robert Scott, for example,
argues that the parties themselves are free to use flexible rules to govern
their non-legal, self-enforcement measures, but that courts should apply
strict rules for contract enforcement.'5 6 Moreover, when Scott argues
that courts should apply strict legal rules, he means that they should
reject the use of mercantile practices and customs to interpret parties'
contractual obligations and instead apply a "literalistic interpretation"
wherein they simply "enforce verifiable express terms" of the parties'
writing. '" Scott argues that limiting courts to "the enforcement of
facially unambiguous express terms will ... generate better and more
accurate interpretations of those portions of disputed contracts that the
parties chose to reduce to formal, legal terms."" While he
acknowledges that strict formalism would encourage parties to expend
more resources drafting written agreements, he argues that strict
formalism is justified because courts are not competent to interpret the
"contextual" evidence (such as course of performances, usages of trade,
etc.) and "leaving contextual and other relational norms to be enforced
by extralegal sanctions might actually improve the efficiency of the legal
regulation of contracts."159
Recent research supports the claim that courts do not use evidence
about mercantile customs and practices well. Lisa Bernstein, for
example, has reviewed evidence from recent cases and concluded not
only that courts probably make significant errors in evaluating usages of
154 Ian MacNeil was especially influential. See generally Ian MacNeil, The Many Futures
of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974). MacNeil subsequently influenced a number of
economists. See generally Oliver Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation:
The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975); Victor Goldberg,
Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45 (1976); Benjamin
Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
55 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 123, at 847-48.
Id. at 852.
57 Id. at 859.
s8 Id. at 860.
159 Scott, supra note 123, at 861.
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trade, but also that these errors probably encourage the parties to many
commercial contracts to incur higher contract drafting costs than they
otherwise would so that they can specify their contract terms expressly
and avoid the risks that courts will apply the wrong usages in
adjudicating their disputes.160 Bernstein's findings are consistent with
her earlier research, in which she studied various trade associations'
attempts to codify their industry customs from the mid-nineteenth to the
mid-twentieth century and found that "even in close-knit communities,
merchant transactors do not, except within very local spheres or in very
general ways, have similar views about the meaning of ... commercial
standards and usages of trade that the . . . [UCC] . . . direct[s] courts to
take into account in deciding cases." 1 61
Professor Scott, together with his coauthors Ronald J. Gilson and
Charles F. Sabel, has recently expressed similar concerns about courts'
use of parties' course of performances and course of dealings to interpret
their contractual obligations.1 6 2 As Gilson et al. explain, "the manifest
inability of generalist courts ... to construe evanescent commercial
practices . . . and the growing realization that . .. customary rules do not
emerge spontaneously from practice . .. exposes the limitations of the
contextualist understanding." 6 3 They argue that a textualist approach
does not reject the use of context altogether, but instead allows the
parties to "choose the extent to which a court can consider context at the
enforcement stage."' 64 It is, in that respect, less "imperialistic" than the
contextual approach.1 6 5 By that, they seem to mean that courts' use of
mercantile practices and customs in interpreting parties' contracts
interferes with the parties' autonomy and intrudes into private
transactions.1 6 6 As support for the formalist approach, they observe that
"both theory and available evidence suggest that legally sophisticated
parties prefer a regime that follows the parties' instructions specifying
when to enforce formal contract terms strictly and when to delegate
160 Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 Nw. U. L. REv. 63, 112 (2015).
161 Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strate.y: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 719 (1999).
6 See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as
Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 23 (2014).
163 Id. at 96.
164 Id. at 43.
165 Id.
166 In concluding, for example, they observe that for textualists (such as themselves), "the
allocation to the parties to decide who chooses the mix of text and context and when that
choice is best made is the expression of intent of an autonomous agent." Gilson et al., supra
note 162, at 96.
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authority to a court to consider surrounding context evidence."1 6 7
There are several problems with the neo-formalist arguments. To
begin with, they offer no persuasive evidence that even legally
sophisticated parties prefer courts that take a formalist approach to
interpreting their contracts. The only reference that Gilson et al. provide
to any empirical evidence that supports their claims is to an article by
Geoffrey Miller that provides a detailed comparison of New York and
California contract law and asserts that there is a "demonstrated
preference of sophisticated contracting parties for the more formalistic
New York approach.. .".16 Miller observes that the article actually
draws on evidence presented in an earlier article by Theodore Eisenberg
and Geoffrey Miller. 16 9 Moreover, he observes in a footnote that "[t]he
results of the present study are not conclusive . .. [and] . .. depend in
part on the reliability of Eisenberg and Miller's empirical analysis."l 7 0 A
reading of the Eisenberg and Miller article,17 ' however, raises serious
questions about the empirical support for the claim that sophisticated
parties prefer formalist rules of contract interpretation.
The Eisenberg and Miller article analyzes choice of law and choice
of forum provisions in a sample of 2,865 contracts reported to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") over several months
during 2002.172 Since the firms that reported the contracts were subject
to SEC reporting requirements they were obviously publicly traded
corporations and thus qualify as sophisticated commercial actors. The
majority of the contracts addressed financial matters or mergers: slightly
over 63% of the contracts covered bond indentures, credit commitments,
mergers, pooling and servicing agreements for asset-backed securities
arrangements, securities purchases, security agreements, or underwriting
agreements.1 73 At the outset, Eisenberg and Miller provide several
reasons why the contracts in their sample might specify that New York
law should govern: New York has been a hub of commercial activity for
many decades and has actually "cultivated its role as the choice of law
17 Id. at 40.
68 Geoffrey Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 32 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1475, 1522 (2010).
169 Id at 1477.
170 Id. at 1478 n.11.
171 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies'
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1457 (2009).
172 Id. at 1487.
173 Table I shows that there were a total of 1,807 contracts of this type in the sample of
2,865. Id. at 1488.
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for commercial matters through early efforts to promote enforceability
of arbitration clauses, through legislation, and through the creation of
specialized business courts."l7 4 They also observe that New York courts
and lawmakers actively attempted to create legal rules that would
encourage use of New York law for financial contracts, but none of the
rules they mentioned were related to the use of parol evidence.s75 In fact,
a careful reading of Eisenberg and Miller's results reveals that they have
little, if anything at all, to say about the parol evidence rule.
Across all types of contacts in their sample, New York law was
chosen in about 46% of the contracts.' 7 6 After New York law in order of
preference was Delaware law, which was chosen in about 14% of the
contracts, and then California law, which was chosen in slightly over 7%
of the contracts.' 77 New York law was the most common choice for ten
of the thirteen types of contracts and all six of the financial types of
contracts. California law, however, was actually a more common choice
for employment contracts, and was almost as common a choice as New
York law for licensing, merger, and settlement contracts.' 7 8 New York
law, therefore, really only appeared to be dominant in financial
contracts. 179 In a regression analysis that excluded merger contracts and
an "other" category, the choice of New York law was only positively
and statistically significantly correlated with seven types of contracts, six
of which were financial. 80 The other type was "asset sales and
purchases," which could also be categorized as financial.' 8 ' The choice
of New York law was not positively and statistically significantly
correlated with any of the other four types of contracts, all of which were
nonfinancial.1 82
In fact, one of the statistically significant results in the Eisenberg
and Miller regressions is that firms incorporated in California and firms
with places of business in California chose not to contract under New
'
74 1d. at 1481.
1 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 171, at 1481.
Id. at 1490.
77d.
Id. at 1490-91. New York law was chosen in 20.41% of the licensing contracts
compared to 16.33% for California law, in 16.75% of the mergers compared to 12.38% for
California law, and in 17.81% of the settlement contracts compared to 15.07% for California
law. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 171, at 1491.
1
7
1 Id. at 1492.
so1 Id. at 1501.
181 Id.
182 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 171, at 1501.
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York law. 183 Eisenberg's and Miller's regression results indicate that the
choice of New York law was negatively and significantly correlated with
contracts reported by firns incorporated in California, and it was also
negatively and significantly correlated with contracts reported by firms
that had places of business in California.1 84 In the aggregate, 82.7% of
the contracts reported by firms that were incorporated in California, or
had their place of business in California, or used an attorney located in
California chose California law and not New York law.'85 And if one
adds contracts involving a second party that was either incorporated in
California or had a place of business in California, 93.3% chose
California law and not New York law.' 86 In short, the Eisenberg and
Miller results provide no compelling evidence whatsoever that
sophisticated Californian firms showed a preference for New York's
"hard" parol evidence rule over California's "soft" rule.
On the other hand, other empirical studies since Stewart
Macaulay's have essentially corroborated his results and have cast.
further doubts on the attraction-and even relevance-of a formalist
approach to contract interpretation. About ten years after Macaulay's
study in the 1970s, Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale interviewed thirty-
three representatives from nineteen engineering manufacturing firms in
Britain.' They found that, in general, the firms in the study used
contracts only for their primary obligations, in part because "within the
trade certain terms and customs or unwritten laws were widely
accepted."'8 8 Although some agreements were carefully negotiated and
documented, most involved the exchange of inconsistent forms and
many were highly informal.189 Interestingly, the firms were less
concerned about forming legally enforceable contracts than they were
about reaching a common understanding about the important or
problematic terms of their deals.1 90 In the vast majority of cases, the
respondents would settle disputes quickly and usually without the help
of legal counsel.' 9' In fact, the respondents were wary of involving
' Id. at 1502.
184 Id.
"8 Id. at 1499.
86 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 171, at 1499.
87 Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use
of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 45, 46 (1975).
188 Id. at 47 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 49-50.
19 Id. at 50.
191 Beale & Dugdale, supra note 187, at 58-59.
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lawyers in their transactions, either at the planning stages or in the event
of disputes, because they felt lawyers were inflexible and not well
informed about commerce.1 92 Whether that is true or not, the results of
the study are inconsistent with the neo-formalist's empirical claims.
In the 1990s, Lane Kenworthy, Stewart Macaulay, and Joel Rogers
conducted a similar study of contracting relations between major U.S.
automobile manufacturers and their suppliers as well as their dealers.' 9 3
They interviewed officials from each of the three major U.S. automobile
manufacturers, fifteen suppliers, and several dealers, as well as
representatives from state and national dealer associations; they also sent
a written survey to 150 suppliers and received a 39% response.194 They
found that the manufacturers had so much bargaining power that their
contracts left suppliers with little, if any, legal protection. 19 5 Although
the imbalance in power created tensions, contract litigation between
manufacturers and suppliers was "extremely rare."' 9 6 Suppliers often
indicated that transactional disputes were not worth litigating, especially
since litigation might sever valuable business relationships. 197 The most
salient aspect of the manufacturers' contractual relations with their
dealers was the reliance on mediation and dispute resolution.1 98
Although the dealers generally had more leverage with manufacturers
than the suppliers, manufacturers put significant effort into maintaining
good relations with their dealers' 99 and the use of ADR mitigated
recourse to litigation. 200 The study suggests that contracting practices in
the automobile industry were focused much more on avoiding litigation
altogether than on limiting the scope of the evidence that could be used
in contract litigation.
Also in the 1990s, Mark Suchman and Mia Cahill conducted a
similar study of Silicon Valley attorneys and their role in the region's
high-tech industries and venture capital financing.20' They interviewed
192 Id. at 59.
193 Lane Kenworthy, Stewart Macaulay & Joel Rogers, "The More Things Change. . .
Business Litigation and Governance in the Automobile Industry, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
631 (1996).
'
94 Id. at 635.
1 Id. at 647, 654.
196 Id. at 652.
197 Kenworthy, Macaulay & Rogers, supra note 193, at 653.
198 Id. at 660-64.
199 Id. at 674.
200 Id. at 666, 674.
201 Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 679 (1996).
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roughly 25 "lawyers, venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs, as well
as ... several individuals who ... played multiple roles over the course
of their careers."202 They found that Silicon Valley attorneys tended to
see themselves as facilitators who help to manage transactional risks
without "over-lawyer[ing]" transactions.2 03 In fact, they found that the
typical venture financing agreement looked less like a "careful
apportionment of legal rights" than a group of business founders,
investors, and attorneys edging their "way over a cliff." 2 04 Interestingly,
however, they attributed significant power to the attorneys as "venture
capital deal makers," which the attorneys acquired through their
experience in the business. 205 Perhaps most interesting of all, they
observed that the attorneys helped to reduce transactional uncertainty by
fostering and reinforcing industry norms and promoting a cooperative
attitude between parties rather than an adversarial one.206 By promoting
community norms, the attorneys helped to "homogenize" transactions,
establish "contractual standards," and "trade practices" that could help
courts interpret ambiguous contract terms.20 7 Professor Suchman and
Professor Cahill even suggest that the Silicon Valley attorneys may have
influenced national legal standards for venture capital financing.2 08 In
short, their study flatly contradicts any idea that the parties to venture
capital financing agreements in Silicon Valley worried about whether
strictly formalistic legal rules would apply to their written instruments.
There is no doubt that neo-formalist scholars can point to cases in
which one of the parties alleged that the court's use of mercantile
practices and customs distorted the court's interpretation of a contract.
One of the limitations of this kind of empirical observation is that it is
inherently biased towards cases that raise the most difficult interpretive
problems. Such cases, of course, inevitably reflect only a tiny fraction of
the contracts actually formed. The overwhelming majority of contracts,
after all, are never litigated. A relatively small number of cases drawn
from the billions of commercial contracts executed in a given year is a
slender thread upon which to advocate rejecting principles of
commercial law that have such deep roots across so many diverse legal
202 Id. at 682 n.19.
203 Id. at 696-97.
204 Id. at 697.
205 Suchman & Cahill, supra note 201, at 697.
206 Id. at 699-700.
207 Id. at 704-05.
208 Id. at 705-08.
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systems. 2 09 The use of mercantile practices and customs to interpret
contract terms may provide great value to the great mass of relational
contracting agreements, even if, in a relatively small number of cases,
they raise interpretative problems that the courts do not deal with well.
In many transactions that are never litigated, the mercantile practices and
customs that might be used to interpret the parties' contract may not be
in dispute or at all controversial. Eliminating a role for mercantile
practices and customs would force the parties to incur higher drafting
costs or perhaps simply to take the risk of having courts adjudicate
disputes without them.
In light of the paucity of evidence in support of the neo-formalist
analysis and the contrary evidence that other studies provide, the claim
that sophisticated parties prefer courts to apply strictly textual
interpretations of their contracts lacks sufficient support to justify
recommending that courts depart from existing rules and practices. Even
if there was sufficient support, the claim that the use of mercantile
practices and customs to supplement or interpret contracts should be of
any concern to sophisticated parties makes no sense whatsoever in light
of the neo-formalists' own behavioral assumptions about sophisticated
parties.
Neo-formalists appear to have overstated the difficulties of
excluding courses of performance, courses of dealing, and usages of
trade from carefully negotiated contracts. 2 10 Although there is some
209 There is no question that courts and lawmakers, as far back as the medieval period, in
many parts of Europe, looked to mercantile customs in attempting to adjudicate disputes.
Kadens, supra note 147, at 1177-83. Kaden alleges that customs were often indeterminate and
did not provide a basis upon which to build the law, not that they were unhelpful in resolving
disputes. Id. at 1194-95.
210 For example, Bernstein asserts that "the enforceability and effectiveness of a general
clause opting out of all trade usages is at best unclear." Bernstein, supra note 160, at 71. For
support, Bernstein cites David V. Snyder, who writes "As custom and conduct are part of the
agreement not only by the fiat of the UCC definition but also as a practical matter, the parties
will have a rough time banishing them generally." David V. Snyder, Language and
Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 S.M.U. L. REV.
617, 635 (2001). But in that part of his article, Professor Snyder was rejecting the use of
conventional default rule analysis for industry custom and conduct. Id. The problem, as he
explained, is that custom and conduct are not gap-fillers like most contract default rules but
aids in the interpretation of contract terms. Id. If the contract defines the seller's quantity as a
"load," for example, usage of trade may help to explain what a load is. Id. at 648. Without any
express definition of the term "load", a clause excluding usage of trade would leave the
contract incomplete. Id. Professor Snyder suggests that the clause might be regarded as
boilerplate and might thus be disregarded in favor of using industry custom to define the term
"load" and complete the contract. Id. at 648-49. But in such a case, the parties' writing could
hardly be described as a complete expression of the terms of their agreement. Id. In fact,
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disagreement about whether an integrated merger clause should exclude
the use of courses of performance, courses of dealing, and usages of
trade to supplement or explain contract terms, the preponderant weight
of the primary and secondary authorities suggests that if parties
intentionally and specifically exclude them with an express contract
clause then courts should abide by their wishes. 2 11 The principle of party
autonomy, one of the overarching doctrines of modem contract law,
requires courts' deference to a clear, unambiguous exclusion of courses
of performance, courses of dealing, and usages of trade.2 12 Sophisticated
parties who are assumed to specify all of their contractual rights and
obligations in writing should also be able to draft a clause that expressly
Professor Snyder is actually quite sanguine about the feasibility of excluding courses of
performance, courses of dealing, and usages of trade. He observes that "negation of usage of
trade and course of dealing can be relatively easy, although it does require attention." Id. at
648.
211 Until relatively recently, there was apparently little disagreement about the ability of
parties to exclude mercantile practices and customs. See Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its
Application to Commercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1192 (1955),
in which the author writes,
if it appears from the contract that the parties intended to exclude the usage, the
practice will, of course, be rejected. For example, the express provisions of a
contract, although making no reference to a trade usage, may preclude its
application because it is inconsistent with it, and hence the court will conclude that
the parties could not have contracted with reference to it. Also where the usage is
specifically excluded in the contract, or the contract excludes trade customs in
general, the usage will not be admitted.
Id. at 1197. Although the question has not often arisen, some cases corroborate the author's
assertions. See, e.g., Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. True's Oil Co., 184 P.2d 827, 829 (Wash.
1947) (finding that an express term excludes custom when it states, "the above plan shall not
be subject to any verbal statements or agreements, or trade customs of any kind or nature");
Iowa Canning Co. v. F.S. Ainsa Co., 267 S.W. 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ("[c]ustom is
never admissible, or read into a written instrument, to contradict what is there plainly stated,
and especially would that be so where the parties have expressly, or by necessary implication
excluded a custom or usage of trade"); Steffner Co. v. Flotill Products, 147 P.2d 84, 86 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1944) ("the parties by their contract may evidence an intention not to be bound
by the usage"); see also 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:11 (2015) ("[u]nder the common
law, a custom or usage may be excluded from the terms of the contract either expressly or by
implication."). Professor Bernstein cites one case in which "a clause excluding usages was
included in the written contract, but not mentioned in the court's opinion." Bernstein, supra
note 160, at 71 n.29. In that case, however, the court held that "whether usage of trade ...
excluded the implied warranty of merchantability is a genuine issue of material fact and not
appropriate for resolution on summary judgment." Leighton Industries, Inc. v. Callier Steel
Pipe & Tube, Inc., No. 89C8235, 1991 WL 18413, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1991).
212 The principle has been codified in UCC § 1-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 2015), as well as the CISG. See Public Notice 1004, U.S. Ratification of 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 52 FR 6262-02
Art. 6 (March 2, 1987).
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excludes the use of courses of performances, courses of dealing, and
usages of trade to interpret other contract terms. In fact, if the parties
need help, there are many standard contract forms that suggest
appropriate language, including at least one that is specifically intended
for use in California, 213 a state in which the neo-formalists seem to think
the risks of errant contract interpretations are high.214 If parties are
unaware that they can exclude mercantile practices and customs, or
incapable of actually doing it, then they are hardly as sophisticated as the
neo-formalist analysis assumes.
Even if parties were not able to exclude courses of performance,
courses of dealing, and usages of trade with express contract clauses,
they could avail themselves of other contracting options to forestall the
use of mercantile practices and customs in interpreting their agreements.
For example, if they were as perturbed about the risks that a court might
misinterpret their agreements as the neo-formalists seem to think, the
parties could opt out of contractual enforcement altogether. 2 15 But even
if they were unable or unwilling to opt out of contractual enforcement
altogether, they could still opt out of "soft" parol evidence rules that
might result in courts using mercantile practices and customs to interpret
their agreements. In fact, the evidence that Gilson et al.2 16 cite about the
purported preference of sophisticated parties for "hard" as opposed to
"soft" parol evidence rules suggests that all the parties have to do to opt
out of soft parol evidences rules and into hard ones is include, within
their (complete and integrated) writing, a choice of law provision. If the
parties are concerned that California law might govern their contract
because they know California applies a soft parol evidence rule and they
would prefer a hard rule like the one applied in New York, they can draft
a choice of law clause specifying that New York law should apply. 2 17
With fifty states, each following its own contract laws, the American
legal system offers a large menu of choices.
213 Cal. Transactions Forms-Bus. Transactions § 24:108 (2016).
214 See generally Gilson et al., supra note 162.
215 Lisa Bernstein has argued that, in the diamond industry, that is essentially what
diamond traders have done. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
216 Gilson et al., supra note 162, at 40.
217 According to Geoffrey Miller, "[b]oth New York and California recognize wide
latitude of the parties to determine the law applicable to their agreements and the forum in
which disputes will be resolved." Miller, supra note 168, at 1508. As he explains, New York
law is more receptive to choice-of-law clauses than California, which may invalidate them if
they would significantly impair substantial legal rights, but it is debatable whether that makes
New York law any more respectful of party autonomy.
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The theory and available evidence therefore do not support courts
abandoning the use of evidence about mercantile practices and customs
in interpreting disputed contract terms. Nor do they support the need for
a different set of contract rules for sophisticated parties-or any other
parties. If anything, they support courts' uses of mercantile practices and
customs in interpreting ambiguous contract terms or supplementing the
express terms of ambiguous contracts, and, in conjunction with the
principle of party autonomy, they affirm the capabilities of sophisticated
parties to select the contract rules that they believe are most appropriate
for their agreements from among the rich menu the American legal
system offers. If anything, the neo-formalist criticisms point to the value
of refinements and improvements in the use of evidence to prove courses
of performances, courses of dealings, and usages of trade, but not to the
need to eliminate them from having a role in commercial contract
adjudication. The use of mercantile practices and customs in interpreting
and supplementing contract terms may not help to develop and improve
contract laws, but it will probably help to support relational agreements
and ensure that courts' adjudication of contractual disputes impinges as
little as possible on liberty.
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The uses of alternatives to conventional litigation often facilitate
relational agreements.2 18 In fact, many contracts include clauses
requiring the use of ADR methods to resolve disputes. Sometimes
parties might also agree to use ADR to resolve disputes after they have
arisen, even if their contract has no clause requiring them to do so. 2 19
Whether the parties reach an agreement to use ADR ex ante or ex post,
as long as they truly intended to bind themselves to their agreement
under the general rules of contract law, courts should enforce their
agreement just as they would enforce any other mutually consensual
contractual commitments. In fact, since the use of ADR has the great
virtue of avoiding the use of the courts and therefore the direct use of
State coercion, it is a practice that advances liberty and should be
encouraged. It is also a practice that may serve the parties' economic
218 See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 187, at 58-59; Kenworthy, Macaulay & Rogers,
supra note 193, at 660-64; Suchman & Cahill, supra note 201, at 699-700; BERNSTEIN, supra
note 215, at 124.
219 Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 1, 2-4 (1990) for a discussion of ex ante and ex post ADR agreements as well as the
economic motives of the parties who make them.
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interests. According to Steven Shavell, for example, ex ante agreements
to use ADR probably increase the parties' welfare by improving the
resolution of some disputes and avoiding the high costs of litigation. 2 20
Although it is less clear that ex post ADR agreements are always
mutually beneficial, 22 1 if parties truly intended to make a contractually
enforceable agreement to bind themselves to ADR, that agreement
should be enforced for the same reasons that other consensual
contractual commitments should be enforced. Courts should not be
responsible for rescuing parties from the consequences of their own bad
decisions.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 222 now provides the most
important part of the legal framework for the use of arbitration in the
United States, even if, as is usually the case, parties contract for the use
of arbitration under state contract law.223 In Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Supreme Court stated that
there is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and that any doubts
about the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of
224
arbitration. Moreover, the FAA is highly deferential to arbitrators, and
provides for judicial review of arbitral awards essentially only if the
arbitrators were grossly malfeasant or incompetent. 2 5  While the
220 Id. at 2.
221 Id at 3.
222 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2012).
223 When the FAA was enacted, its supporters contended that it was a procedural statute.
In a series of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court clarified that the FAA provided
substantive federal law with broad preemptive effect over conflicting state laws. See
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 943-48 (1999). The FAA therefore now applies in state
courts, as well as federal courts. Id. Moreover, unless there is a defect in the arbitration clause,
the arbitrator must decide state contract law defenses. Id.
224 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
225 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). The four statutory grounds for vacating arbitral awards are as
follows:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
Id.
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Supreme Court has made it clear that courts should not expand the scope
of judicial review of arbitral awards beyond the grounds specified in the
FAA, it has not rejected language that allows courts to overturn arbitral
awards if they are in "manifest disregard" of the law,22 6 and it is not
clear exactly what that language means.22 7 Unfortunately, it appears that
courts have interpreted the language differently, and some still overturn
arbitral awards on non-statutory grounds.228 Some scholars agree with a
broader scope for judicial review. Michael LeRoy, for example, argues
that "judicial review must be available to correct an arbitrator's
intentional flouting of the law" 229 because "no man . .. is above the
law." 230
In spite of the concerns, there is a strong public policy in favor of
supporting the finality of arbitral awards and other outcomes of ADR.
Part of the purpose of ADR is to avoid litigation costs, and if the scope
for reviewing arbitral awards is broadened too far then the potential
economies will be lost because an ADR clause will simply add an
additional step to the litigation process. If parties truly intend to commit
themselves to binding arbitration, with the full knowledge that any
arbitral award will be subject to the narrow grounds for judicial review
available under the FAA, then courts should enforce any arbitral awards
strictly, applying only the grounds for review that the parties impliedly
agreed to. If courts broadened the scope of judicial review, they could
overturn an award that was consistent with the parties' agreement,
potentially abusing the power of State coercion. State coercion would
thus be used to interfere with a consensual private agreement rather than
to support it. Moreover, since parties with more resources would
probably, in general, be better able to use courts to challenge arbitral
awards, State coercion would more commonly be used on behalf of
socially and economically powerful parties than it would be used on
behalf of weaker ones.
226 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
227 In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court contributed to the confusion by stating that
"manifest disregard" of the law might simply mean in disregard of the standards under the
FAA or it might mean an additional, non-statutory standard for reviewing arbitral awards.
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).
228 See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The 'Manifest Disregard of
the Law' Standard, 52 B.C. L. REv. 137, 178 (2011) for an empirical study of challenges to
arbitral awards comparing pre-Hall and post-Hall success rates. LeRoy observes that Hall
actually caused a split among the federal circuits and that state courts continue to interpret the
manifest disregard standard differently. Id. at 180-82.229 Id. at 187.
230 Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
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ADR clauses create problems, however, when it is not clear that
both (or all) of the parties truly intended to commit themselves to ADR.
If an arbitral award was enforced against a party that had not truly
intended to be bound by an arbitral clause, the power of State coercion
would be used inappropriately. Unfortunately, when State coercion of
any kind is exercised, there is always the possibility that it may be used
for the benefit of some and at the expense of others. Since it seems more
likely that parties with fewer resources and less acumen might
unintentionally become bound to ADR clauses than those who are better
financed and more sophisticated,2 3 1 there is a risk that the misuse of
State coercion to enforce arbitral awards would most commonly be on
behalf of those with the most power and influence.
Fortunately, an arbitral award can still be defeated using general
contract defenses targeted specifically at the arbitration clause.232 Thus,
a claim that an arbitration clause is unconscionable could be used to
overturn an arbitral award made under the arbitration clause. An
aggrieved party might also be able to avail itself of other principles of
contract law, such as the one stated in Section 211(3) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts,23 3 which precludes a party from taking advantage
of another party's ignorance by enforcing a contract term if he knew that
the other party would not have assented to the agreement if she had
234known about the contract term. In theory, an aggrieved party should
be able to challenge an arbitral award using Section 211(3) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on the grounds that she did not truly
assent to the arbitration clause. In practice, courts may not have been as
receptive to the use of Section 211(3) as they should have been,235 but
this is something that the courts can, and probably should, change if they
are to avoid misusing their powers.
ADR clauses and binding arbitration facilitate relational agreements
231 As Stone observes:
Today many arbitration clauses are found not in contracts between equals in a
shared community, but rather in contracts of adhesion between insiders and
outsiders, such as between a powerful association and a nonmember or between a
big corporation and a consumer.
Stone, supra note 223, at 1025.
232 Id. at 948-49.
233 Id. at 1019.
234 The Restatement states: "Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
235 Stone, supra note 223, at 1024.
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and help to avoid the direct use of State coercion, but they can also be
abused. If liberty is to be advanced, courts should limit the scope of
review of arbitral awards to the grounds that the parties have expressly
or impliedly consented to under the FAA. But since more powerful
parties can abuse arbitration at the expense of weaker parties, courts
should be receptive to challenges against arbitral awards based on claims
that 1) the arbitration clauses under which the awards were made were
unconscionable or 2) the party seeking to enforce the award knew that
the other party would not have assented to the contract if she had known
that the writing included the arbitration clause.
B. Unconscionability
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, if the objective is to
advance liberty, there is a role in contract law for rules or doctrines that
allow courts to void contracts or contract terms. In the United States, the
doctrine of unconscionability serves that purpose.23 6 The doctrine of
unconscionability allows a court to void a contract or terms of a contract
if the terms are so unfair that enforcing them would cause oppression
and/or unfair surprise.237 Since that appears to be an interference with a
market transaction, scholars who favor liberty and free markets have
widely criticized the doctrine of unconscionability. 238 As Robert Hillman
has observed, however, there is a fine line between regulating a contract
and interpreting it, and guile during the negotiation of an agreement
often precedes an overreaching interpretation of contract terms later
236 The Restatement states:
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR TERM
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
237 The doctrine is most commonly applied today using a two-pronged test that was first
proposed by Arthur Leff. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967). The first prong applies a test for
procedural abuse, which is satisfied by evidence of sharp dealing, deceptive bargaining
tactics, and unequal bargaining power. See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT,
SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 155 (1999). The second prong applies a test for
substantive abuse, which is satisfied by evidence that the terms are so one-sided and grossly
unfair that it would be inequitable to enforce them. Id. As UCC Section 2-302, comment I
states, "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise." U.C.C. §2-
302, cmt. I (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
238 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 294-95 (1975).
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on. 239 Unconscionability cases, therefore, can often be understood to be
about contract interpretation rather than contract regulation.24 0 One
could argue that if the terms of an agreement are so unfair that it would
be inequitable for a court to enforce them, the terms could not have been
truly bargained-for. 24 1 And, of course, if the terms were not truly
bargained-for, then they could not really have been part of any
242
meaningful, consensual agreement.
Unconscionability cases thus raise questions about the appropriate
exercise of State coercion. If the terms of a contract are unconscionable,
the party against whom enforcement of the terms is sought did not truly
consent to the use of State coercion to enforce them.243 If a court
enforced the contract, therefore, it would be using the State's power of
coercion to enforce a claim by the one party against another, even
though the other had not consented to subject itself to the exercise of
State coercion under such circumstances.244 The court would, in effect,
be serving as an instrument through which one party exercised coercion
against the other. Under such circumstances, one could argue that a court
would further liberty by using the unconscionability doctrine to void the
contractual obligation rather than enforce it.
Of course, the unconscionability doctrine is a double-edged sword
and a court could apply it in error.245 If courts routinely applied the
unconscionability doctrine to void contractual obligations in
circumstances where the obliged parties did assent to the contract terms,
that would undermine the ability of parties, in general, to commit
themselves to legally enforceable agreements. Unconscionability,
therefore, has an important role to play in advancing liberty, but it can
also be abused. The risks to liberty associated with misapplying the
doctrine, however, seem less than those associated with the risks of
failing to apply it when it should be applied. When a court uses the
unconscionability doctrine to void a contractual obligation it merely
declines to exercise the State's coercive powers to bind a party to the
239 See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (discussing and
synthesizing the rich array of modem theories of contract law).
240 See id. at 129-43; See also Donald J. Smythe, Consideration for a Price, 34 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 109, 126-32 (2013) for a discussion of common law contract cases that are
purportedly about unconscionability, but upon careful reading seem to be about contract
interpretation.
41 Smythe, supra note 7, at 47.
242 Barnett, supra note 14, at 318.
243 Smythe, supra note 7, at 47.
244 Id.
245 Id
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purported obligation.246 That does not involve any exercise of coercion
or even interfere with the parties' agreement.24 7 The intent and will of
the parties may be undermined when the court allows them to evade
obligations to which they truly did intend to commit themselves, but that
does not impede their liberty. Nonetheless, the unconscionability
doctrine should be applied only in the appropriate circumstances. Those
circumstances may be difficult to ascertain and verify and courts will
inevitably make mistakes. If the purpose of the State is to advance
liberty, however, the doctrine of unconscionability-or some other rule
that allows courts to void inequitable, nonconsensual contract terms-
should have an important role in modem contract law.
C. Impracticability
Sometimes after a contract has been formed a party seeks to be
excused from the performance of an obligation. This has led to the
development of a number of doctrines under which courts will grant
parties excuses from contractual obligations. 2 48 The doctrine of
impracticability was the most recent excuse doctrine to emerge from the
cases, and it is arguably the most relevant. Under the doctrine of
impracticability a party may be excused from performance of its
contractual obligations if its performance has become impracticable due
to contingencies that were reasonably unforeseen at the time of
contracting. 2 49 In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, for example, a
party had contracted to build a bridge, but discovered that due to
246 d
247 Smythe, supra note 7, at 47.
248 Under the doctrine of impossibility, a party may be granted an excuse from the
performance of a contractual obligation if the party's performance has become impossible.
Under the frustration of purpose doctrine, on the other hand, a party may be excused from
performance of a contractual obligation if the basic purpose of the contract has been
frustrated. The doctrine of impracticability is the most recent and broadest excuse doctrine,
and, in some cases, it allows a party to be excused when the party's performance would
simply cause an economic hardship. See Smythe, supra note 103, at 227-29, for an overview.
Id. at 227. The UCC has adopted the doctrine, which states:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery ... by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b)
and (c) is not a breach of his duty . .. if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption on which the contract was made. . . ."
U.C.C. §2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015). UCC § 2-615, comment I
explains, "[t]his section excuses a seller ... where his performance has become commercially
impracticable because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting." U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. I (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM'N 2015).
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difficult soil conditions that were unknown at the time of contracting, the
construction costs would be several times larger than expected and
building the bridge would cause it to suffer severe economic hardship, if
not complete financial ruin; under those circumstances, the court
excused the party from performance.2 50 The doctrine of impracticability
is probably the most important excuse doctrine today since it has been
adopted in Section 2-615 of the UCC and arguably also in Article 79 of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods.251 It is also the broadest.
As the scope of contractual excuse doctrines has broadened, some
scholars have raised concerns, particularly those who fear that parties
may be able to use broader excuse doctrines to evade contractual
obligations to which they committed themselves to be bound.2 52 This
article concurs with their concern. Nonetheless, some scholars may, at
times, have misconstrued the courts' role in adjudicating contractual
disputes. For example, some scholars have criticized courts for
interfering with the allocation of parties' risks when they grant
contractual excuses. 253
When a court grants a party an excuse from performance of a
contractual obligation, it does not interfere with the contractual
allocation of risks, even if the court has misapplied an excuse doctrine
and allowed it to be used opportunistically.254 There is an important
difference between a court using its coercive powers to change the risk
250 Mineral Park Land Co. v Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916).
251 For a discussion of Article 79, see Larry A. DiMatteo, Contractual Excuse Under the
CISG: Impediment, Hardship, and the Excuse Doctrines, 27 PACE INT'L L. REv. 258, 285
(2015).
2 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-
term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv 521, 524 (1985); Alan 0. Sykes, The Doctrine of
Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1990); George
G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of
Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L. J. 450, 451-52 (1992).
253 See, e.g., Triantis, supra note 252, at 480 ("[Jludicial reallocation of risk through
contract doctrine such as commercial impracticability is an interference with freedom of
contract that cannot be justified on grounds of economic efficiency."); Gillette, supra note
252, at 527 ("[T]he existence of a state-imposed, presumptive gap filler that permits excuse
may predetermine what allocation will be chosen by the parties."); Robert E. Scott, Conflict
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2009 (1987) ("The highly
interactive nature of the parties' response to problems of noncooperation makes the effects of
any legally imposed adjustment largely unpredictable. Adjusting losses coercively may
sometimes be consistent with the cooperative strategies the parties have developed. But, . . . I
conclude ... that the existing foundation of highly complex social and contractual norms
requires broad party autonomy .... ).
254 See HILLMAN, supra note 239, at 32-36.
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allocations in an agreement, and a court declining to use its coercive
powers to bind parties to a purported agreement allocating their risks.
More to the point of this article, in the former case, the court would
undermine liberty because it would use the power of State coercion
against at least one of the party's will; in the latter case the court could
never undermine liberty because it would simply be declining to use the
power of State coercion. In fact, it would probably be a mistake to
presume that courts have run amuck and granted too many excuses when
they should not have done so. 2 55
Nonetheless, if parties are concerned about the possibility that
courts might misapply an excuse doctrine, they have considerable
flexibility to mitigate the risk contractually. Under the principle of party
256autonomy, parties are free to contract around any of the default rules
or doctrines that would otherwise apply to their agreement, except, of
course, for those such as the doctrine of good faith or fair dealing
requirements that are usually considered integral to any reasonable
bargain.2 5 7 In fact, the implication is that if parties are aware of the rules
and doctrines that courts will apply to their agreement and they do not
expressly waive or modify them, it is their intention to contract under
them.2 58 The implication is just as strong for excuse doctrines that might
apply to the parties' contract as it is for any other contract rules or
doctrines. 25 9 Thus, if a court does apply the doctrine of impracticability
to a contract between parties who understood their contractual rights and
obligations at the time they made their agreement, the court's decision is
impliedly made under the terms of the parties' bargain and in accord
255 If anything, courts may be too reluctant to grant contractual excuses. As Robert Scott
has observed, "The most curious aspect of the commercial impracticability cases decided over
the past 20 years has been the courts' steadfast refusal to grant excuse for nonperformance
despite the apparent invitation to do so in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Second
Restatement." Scott, supra note 253, at 2006 n. 1.
256 The principle is reflected in UCC § 1-302 on "Variation By Agreement," as well as the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 6. U.C.C.
§ 1-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015); 1 U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the Int'l Sale of Goods vi, Ch. 1, Art. 6 (1980) ("The parties may exclude the application of
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions.").
257 See, e.g., U.C.C. §1-320(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) ("The
obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the Uniform
Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement.").
258 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821, 864-865 (1982).
259 Smythe, supra note 103, at 264.
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with their intent and will. 2 60 Even if courts inadvertently apply an excuse
doctrine when they should not, that is a risk that the parties bargained for
at the time of contracting. In other words, as long as the parties are
sophisticated enough to understand their rights and obligations at the
time they contract, courts do not interfere with their contractual
allocation of risks by applying a contract excuse doctrine; on the
contrary, they actually comply with the parties' allocation of risks.
In any case, it seems unlikely that courts commonly misapply
excuse doctrines. The doctrine of impracticability, for example, is
normally applied using a two pronged test. 26 1 Under the most persuasive
interpretation of the test, courts will grant an excuse only if the
circumstances giving rise to the impracticability claim were reasonably
unforeseen at the time of contracting and if the party under the
obligation would suffer a severe economic hardship if it was required to
perform. 26 2 If a party succeeds with an impracticability claim under the
test, it seems doubtful whether it could have truly intended to commit to
any of the excused obligations, at least under the circumstances.263 For
one thing, it is difficult to understand how a party could have truly
agreed to perform an obligation under circumstances that were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting. Moreover, it is equally
difficult to understand how a party could have truly agreed to perform an
obligation under any foreseeable circumstances that would cause it to
suffer such a severe economic hardship, especially since the parties
could have waived the application of the impracticability doctrine under
those circumstances.
Excuse doctrines are another double-edged sword. On the one hand,
if they are applied when they should not be, they allow a party to evade
an obligation that it agreed to perform, thus facilitating opportunism; on
the other hand, if they are not applied when they should be, then a court
enforcing the contractual obligations uses the State's power of coercion
against a party without the party's consent and against the party's will.
As with the doctrine of unconscionability, however, courts' errors will
have more adverse effects on liberty when they result in mistaken
contractual enforcements than when they result in mistaken contractual
excuses. When a court grants an excuse to a party it does not thereby
exercise State coercion; it merely declines to use the power of State
2 60 id.
261 Id. at 236.
262 Id.
263 Bamett, supra note 14, at 318.
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coercion to compel the party to perform. When a court declines to grant
an excuse to a party that did not, under the circumstances, truly intend to
be bound to its performance, the court does exercise State coercion, and
it does so against the party's will. If the primary purpose of the State is
to protect liberty, then there is an important role for the doctrine of
impracticability in modem contract law.
D. Public Policy
The analysis in this article is premised on a definition of liberty that
includes a respect for individuals' "private spheres"-that is, realms of
personal autonomy and privacy within which individuals should be free
from government intrusions. This raises inevitable questions about what
rights and freedoms should be included within individuals' private
spheres. Complete answers to those questions are beyond the scope of
the article, but the reference to individuals' spheres of private autonomy
here is meant to include at least the rights and freedoms that individuals
enjoy under all applicable constitutions and statutes. Of course, there
will always be debate about the scope of individual rights and
freedoms.264 For the sake of the present analysis, under United States
law individual freedoms may be considered to be at least as broad as the
full "penumbra" of rights and freedoms that individuals enjoy against the
State under federal and state constitutions and statutes, as well as any of
the judicial decisions that interpret them. 265
Setting aside debates about the scope of the rights protected within
individuals' private spheres, if one accepts the premise that these are
rights the State may not intrude upon, there are some clear implications
for contracts. If liberty is to advance, courts should refrain from
enforcing agreements that impinge on individuals' private spheres.266
This means that if an agreement between two parties creates an
obligation that impinges on the rights or freedoms within an individual's
private sphere, a court should not enforce the obligation. If a court
enforced the obligation it would thereby use the power of State coercion
264 As a general matter, it seems obvious that any serious libertarian should want
individual rights and freedoms to be defined as broadly as possible.
265 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (references "penumbra" of rights).
The term has deep roots in American law and apparently originates from a law review article
by Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Burr Henly, "Penumbra": The Roots ofa Legal Metaphor, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 84 (1987) for a discussion.
266 See Smythe, supra note 7, at 51-58 for a related discussion of contract with lifestyle
covenants.
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to impinge on rights and freedoms that, as a matter of law, are supposed
to be free from State impingement or interference.26 7 As a general
matter, court enforcements of contractual rights and obligations are not
considered "State action" and are thus usually beyond the reach of
constitutional constraints. 26 8  But if an agreement does create an
obligation that impinges on rights or freedoms that an individual should
enjoy free from State intrusion, the agreement should not be enforced as
a matter of contract law, even though it can be enforced as a matter of
constitutional law.269
As a general matter, "contracts against public policy" are not
enforceable.270 If the advancement of liberty is to be embraced as the
most fundamental purpose of the State, an agreement that would, if
enforced by a court, impinge on rights and freedoms that are protected
against State intrusion should not be enforced as a matter of public
267 id.
268 As Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, the United States Supreme Court has generally
limited the definition of State action under the State action doctrine to acts undertaken by the
executive and legislative branches. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 507-27. Thus, actions
undertaken by the judicial branch, including court enforcements of private legal rights, are
generally not considered State acts under the State action doctrine. Id. The most important
exception is Shelley v. Kramer, in which the United States Supreme Court held that "action of
state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14
(1948). Shelley, however, was an exceptional case involving a challenge against racially
restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court has not followed Shelley in other cases and has
generally not treated other court actions in other cases as State action. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 6, at 528.
269 Although courts are usually not considered State actors under the State action doctrine,
they are still State actors in the common sense of the term. As Professor Chemerinsky
observed, "[T]here seems little doubt that judges are government actors and that judicial
remedies are state action." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 527.
270 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 117 n.4 (1988). The term "contracts against public
policy" is confusing because a contract is a legally enforceable agreement and an agreement
against public policy is not enforceable. The term is nonetheless an established idiom of
American legal language. Moreover, it defines an established principle of American contract
law. For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) states:
178. When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms.
(Emphasis added.) See David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public
Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2012), for a recent discussion and survey of "contracts
against public policy."
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policy. It is easy to provide some examples of agreements that impinge
on individual rights and freedoms that are protected against State
intrusion:
(1) lifestyle covenants in an employment agreement that forbid a
"non-ministerial" 27' employee from having an abortion or marrying
a person of the same sex;272
(2) an agreement between a gestational surrogate mother and
another individual that obligated the mother to have an abortion;273
and
(3) an agreement between neighbors not to post constitutionally
permissible political signs during a political campaign.
271 There is a "ministerial exception" that exempts religious organizations from anti-
discrimination statutes that would otherwise prevent them from enforcing many obligations
under lifestyle agreements. Since the ministerial exception arises as a matter of constitutional
law, it arguably takes certain rights and freedoms outside the scope of individuals' private
spheres. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
As the term suggests, the ministerial exception applies to an employee who qualifies as a
"minister" within the religious organization. See Smythe, supra note 7, at 52 for a discussion
of the ministerial exception.
272 Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses have been used in some employment
agreements since at least the middle of the twentieth century. They have been prevalent in the
sports and entertainment industries. Some important cases arose during the McCarthy era,
when film directors, writers, and actors were alleged to have violated morals clauses through
their political associations. See, e.g., Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 87-88
(9th Cir. 1957); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th
Cir. 1954); Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1950). Some prominent
recent cases have involved teachers at religious schools who were terminated for making
lifestyle or moral decisions that violated the schools' religious principles, such as using in
vitro fertilization or marrying a person of the same sex. See Smythe, supra note 7, at 51-58.
273 For a discussion of a recent case, see Katie O'Reilly, When Parents and Surrogates
Disagree on Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/surrogacy-contract-melissa-cook/463323.
As O'Reilly explains, a "non-gestational" surrogate is one who is also the genetic parent of
the child; a "gestational" surrogate, on the other hand, is not the genetic parent of the child
and thus serves only as a surrogate for the gestation of the embryo. The legal issues
surrounding such cases have not been fully settled, but it seems clear that the surrogate's
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy should include the sole right to decide whether to
have an abortion. For a discussion of a case in which the surrogate's autonomy was initially
challenged, see Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (March 6,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/.
274 The legal implications of agreements to restrict speech raise many nuances and have
not been fully resolved. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and
Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 344-45 (1998). As Professor Garfield
observes, a constitutional challenge against an agreement to restrict speech is difficult because
it first requires proving that the court enforcement would involve State action and then
requires proving that the party challenging court enforcement did not waive her First
Amendment rights when she made the agreement. Id. at 349-58. There are obviously many
agreements to restrict speech that should be enforceable, such as those governing trade secrets
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If a government enacted a statute that forbid an individual from having
an abortion or marrying a person of the same sex, or required a surrogate
to have an abortion, or forbid the posting of a constitutionally
permissible political sign, a court would be obligated not only to decline
to enforce the statute but also to declare it unconstitutional. As a matter
of public policy, courts should decline to enforce an agreement that
creates restrictions or obligations that impinge on the rights and
freedoms within an individual's private sphere for the same reason that
they would decline to enforce a government statute that impinged on the
same rights and freedoms.275
This does not mean that the State should prohibit agreements
between individuals that create restrictions or obligations that impinge
on rights and freedoms within their private spheres. Unless an agreement
obligated one or more of the parties to engage in coercion of some kind,
making it illegal would implicate the State in using its powers of
coercion to restrict liberty.276 As long as courts refrained from enforcing
such agreements, parties' compliance with any restrictions or obligations
that impinged on their private spheres would be voluntary.277 For
example, if a clause in a surrogacy agreement requires the surrogate to
have an abortion if the fetus shows signs of Down syndrome, that
agreement should not be legally enforceable. A court should not use the
power of State coercion to force a woman to have an abortion against
her will, even if it was her intent and will to commit herself to having an
abortion under those circumstances at the time she made the agreement.
But the State has no business enacting a statute that regulates surrogacy
agreements between private individuals. Liberty requires that individuals
should be free to make whatever private surrogacy agreements they like,
even if the agreements are not legally enforceable. If the surrogate
voluntarily aborts a fetus with Down syndrome, that is her right; if she
or individuals' privacy, which would normally be exempt from the First Amendment's reach.
Id. at 300-03, 360-61. But there are also many agreements to restrict speech that do raise
obvious public policy concerns, such as those against revealing crimes. Id. at 307-09.
Professor Garfield argues that courts should generally refrain from enforcing agreements that
restrict speech, and offers an approach to balancing competing public policy interests. Id. at
312-18, 344-45.
275 If court enforcements of private rights and obligations were generally treated as State
action under the State action doctrine there would obviously be no need to apply the public
policy exception. But they are not, even though, as Chemerinsky observes, "[T]here seems
little doubt that judges are government actors and that judicial remedies are state action."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 527.
276 Smythe, supra note 7, at 17.
277 id.
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chooses not to abort the fetus that is her right too.
There is thus an important role in contract law for the principle that
agreements against public policy will not be enforced. If liberty is to be
advanced, courts should refrain from enforcing agreements that impinge
on rights or obligations within individuals' spheres of personal
autonomy and privacy. Enforcing such agreements would impinge on
liberties that are protected against State action under federal or state
constitutions and statutes. While the State action doctrine does not
usually extend to court enforcements of private agreements, the public
policy rationale for the constraint on the exercise of State coercion does.
Of course, the full penumbra of rights and freedoms established under
federal and state constitutions and statutes is complex and sometimes
uncertain. The logical test for whether the public policy restraint should
apply is whether a legislature could use the power of State coercion to
force an individual to perform or refrain from performing in exactly the
same way that the agreement ostensibly requires. In general, if a
legislature could force the individual's performance or forbearance
without violating any constitutional or statutory constraints, then the
agreement should be enforced; if the legislature could not force the
individual's performance or forbearance without violating some
constitutional or statutory constraint, then the public policy restraint
should apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article outlines what might be called a minimalist-or
Hayekian-libertarian theory of contracts. To that end, it defines liberty
to require that individuals be as free as possible from the exercise of
coercion by others, and that they have a sphere of personal autonomy
and privacy within which they are free from intrusions by the State.
Coercion is defined to mean the control of the environment or
circumstances of a person to the extent that she is forced to serve the
ends of another; that definition obviously includes the use of force or the
threat of force. If the fundamental purpose of the State is to advance this
minimalist conception of liberty, the most compelling justification for
having contract laws at all is because they are necessary to avoid
interpersonal conflict and violence. If such is the case, the need for
private laws, including contract laws, was greater in primitive societies
than it is in highly developed ones like the United States and other
developed nations today.
Modem contract theorists have reformulated contract law around
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the need to respect the intent and will of autonomous, free individuals
and the need to facilitate exchange in a modem, capitalist economic
system. For example, both the theory of contractual consent and the
consideration requirement serve to advance liberty. Each operates as a
separate screen, limiting the range of private agreements that may be
enforced using State coercion. The consent theory filters out agreements
when parties did not intend to make legally binding commitments and
the consideration requirement filters our agreements in which there is no
evidence of an exchange. Modem contract theories also imply that
courts should respect individuals' autonomy to make agreements that are
not legally enforceable, such as those that are purely relational.
Relational agreements are quite common and parties are often able
to enforce them without the use of the courts. To the extent that they
limit reliance on the courts and thus the use of State coercion, they
should be encouraged. As a general matter, they can be facilitated by
contract laws that (1) have a well-defined statute of frauds or other
threshold requirements for legally enforceable agreements that makes it
easier for parties to opt out of contractual enforcement; (2) allow the use
of parol evidence in interpreting ambiguous or incomplete contracts so
that parties that wish to rely primarily on relational enforcement
mechanisms can still use contractual safeguards without having to go to
the expense of negotiating and drafting detailed, written agreements; (3)
allow courts to use mercantile practices and customs in interpreting and
supplementing parties' agreements, which also helps parties to avoid
unnecessary negotiating and drafting expenses; and (4) strictly enforce
ADR clauses that parties clearly intended to commit themselves to, with
only a narrow scope for judicial review.
The analysis suggests that other contract doctrines, such as
unconscionability and impracticability, may also help militate against
the inappropriate exercise of State coercion. The doctrines of
unconscionability and impracticability help to prevent contractual
enforcements when it is not clear under the circumstances that parties
truly intended to commit themselves to a contractual obligation. They
thus help to prevent the use of State coercion to force parties to provide
performances or engage in forbearances that they did not truly consent
to. As a general matter, the most sophisticated party to the transaction-
the one with the greatest economic resources and legal acumen-
typically drafts the written terms of a contract. Contract doctrines such
as unconscionability and impracticability may, therefore, help to prevent
the stronger parties in transactions from using the power of State
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coercion against the weaker parties without their consent and against
their will.
The doctrine that courts should refrain from enforcing agreements
that are against public policy may play a more special role in limiting the
inappropriate exercise of State coercion. Even a minimalist conception
of liberty, such as the one Hayek provides, recognizes that individuals
should have spheres of personal autonomy and privacy within which
they are free to speak their minds, associate with whomever they choose,
and do whatever they like free from any State interferences or restraints.
In the United States, individuals' private spheres should correspond at
the least to all the rights and freedoms that they enjoy under all
applicable federal and state constitutions and statutes. In fact, most
libertarians would probably prefer to define the full scope of individuals'
rights and freedoms even more broadly than that. Although court
enforcements are State action in the literal sense, they are not State
action under the State action doctrine for the purpose of applying most
constitutional constraints against State interferences with liberty. The
"contracts against public policy" doctrine provides a way for courts to
constrain themselves by declining to enforce agreements that purport to
create individual restraints or obligations that would be unconstitutional
if they were created under a government statute.
Since this article began with a quote by Friedrich Hayek, it is fitting
that it should also end with one. Many of the most prominent
contributions to modem contract theory, including those by some of the
neo-formalist scholars that have been discussed in this article, have
drawn on conventional economic rationality assumptions to offer
normative prescriptions about contract rules and doctrines. This was in
stark contrast to Hayek's approach, which was always to make liberty
the cornerstone of his analysis. One wonders what Hayek would have
thought about modem contract scholarship, given that he wrote:
[R]ationalistic ... theories ... [are] ... necessarily based on the assumption of
the individual man's propensity for rational action and his natural
intelligence . . . . It would hardly be unjust to say that the rationalistic approach
is ... opposed to almost all that is the distinct product of liberty and gives
liberty its value. Those who ... cannot conceive of anything serving a human
purpose that has not been consciously designed are almost of necessity
enemies of freedom. 278
278 HAYEK, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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